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INTRODUCTION 
On February 5, 2015, electronic retailer RadioShack filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.1  RadioShack previously 
announced that it planned to sell the personally identifiable 
information of 117 million consumers in asset auctions across several 
states.2  The following month, RadioShack sought to sell its 
“transaction data,” along with 8.5 million customer email addresses 
and 67 million customer names and address files.3  This trove of 
personal data would be a valuable asset to third party marketers,4 as it 
would reveal what items customers purchased, where they purchased 
it, and how much they paid.5 
Ultimately, a bankruptcy judge approved the sale of RadioShack’s 
customer data for $26 million, which after negotiations sold the names 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. Katy Stech, Privacy Concerns Raised as RadioShack Prepares to Sell 
Customer Data, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/privacy-concerns-raised-as-radioshack-prepares-to-sell-
customer-data-1430252834 [https://perma.cc/2FCF-G3MJ]. 
 2. Randall Chase, RadioShack Agrees To Mediation With Attorneys General 
Over Bankruptcy Sale Of Customer Data, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2015/04/28/radioshack-agrees-to-
mediation-over-sale-of-customer-data [https://perma.cc/V5UJ-WRMQ]. 
 3. Chase, supra note 2. 
 4. See Stech, supra note 1. 
 5. Chase, supra note 2. 
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and addresses of 67 million former customers.6  This controversial sale 
not only alarmed the public and state regulators, but arguably directly 
breached RadioShack’s privacy policy.7  Indeed, RadioShack’s 
privacy policy provided that it would not “sell or rent” customers’ 
“personally identifiable information to anyone at any time.”8  
RadioShack’s privacy policy also claimed that it “respect[ed]” 
customer’s privacy, and would abstain from selling its mailing lists.9  
How could RadioShack break its own privacy promises and operate 
against former assurances to customers? 
The RadioShack case typifies systematic problems of privacy 
policies and online notice.  Sometimes, companies like RadioShack 
will break their own promises to customers, and appropriate 
consumer data in ways that the average consumers would not 
anticipate.10  More often, however, privacy policies are vague or silent 
about core data practices.11  Commercial websites often collect, share, 
and retain consumer information without mentioning these practices 
or disclosing their specific details in privacy policies.12  Furthermore, 
the verbose and legalistic character of policy language often makes it 
difficult for consumers to understand privacy terms,13 and the format 
of privacy policies deters consumers from reading them.  Research 
shows that the majority of consumers do not read privacy policies14 
and this may be because they are often displayed in dense paragraphs 
of crowded text. 
                                                                                                                                      
 6. See Nick Brown, U.S. Judge Rules RadioShack IP Auction Was Fair, 
REUTERS (May 20, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-radioshack-bankruptcy-
idUSKBN0O52I120150520 [https://perma.cc/SYC9-7GML]. 
 7. See State Of Texas’s Limited Objection To Sale Of Personally Identifiable 
Information Of One Hundred Seventeen Million Consumers, In re RadioShack 
Corporation, et al., 2015 WL 641870, No. 15-10197-KJC,  3 (Bankr. Del. Mar. 20, 
2015) (No. 1393). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 3-4. 
 10. See, e.g., Complaint, at 2, In re Upromise, Inc., FTC File No. 102 3116, No. C-
4351 (F.T.C. Mar. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Upromise Complaint]. 
 11. See J. R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches 
Between Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 87 (2015). 
 12. See Fact Sheet 18: Online Privacy: Using the Internet Safely, PRIVACY RTS. 
CLEARING HOUSE (Jan. 2016), https://www.privacyrights.org/online-privacy-using-
internet-safely [https://perma.cc/8KHF-JV2M]. 
 13. See Irene Pollach, What’s Wrong with Online Privacy Policies?, 50 COMM’N 
OF THE ACM 103, 104 (2007). 
 14. See Sarah Gordon, Privacy: A Study of Attitudes and Behaviors in US, UK 
and EU Information Security Professionals, SYSTEMATIC SECURITY RESPONSE 12 
(2003). 
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In response to these prevalent issues, this Note explores how 
companies alter their privacy policies so that they will become usable 
notice mechanisms of online data collection and dissemination 
practices.  Part I analyzes common law and statutory sources of notice 
regulation in the United States.  Part I also addresses the Federal 
Trade Commission’s (FTC) privacy jurisprudence as well as notice 
and choice, the dominant model for displaying and attaining users 
consent to the terms of online privacy policies. 
Part II examines and extracts the most salient principles of 
effective notice from established relevant legal models.  Each legal 
model represents a different aspect of commercial practice, and their 
notice standards thus provides valuable insights for conveying 
effective notice in the context of commercial websites and online 
consumer transactions.  To illustrate greater standards of notice in the 
domain of commercial contracts, this section first studies notice 
requirements of enforceable arbitration agreements.  The second 
legal model discussed is the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 
over-the-counter (OTC) drug labeling rule.  This section examines 
FDA labeling practices to highlight what constitutes sufficient notice 
and warnings in highly regulated industries.  Part II then describes 
different FTC enforcement actions that relate to consumer privacy 
harms as a reflection of greater notice and privacy standards of 
general commercial entities.  Part II concludes with an overview of 
some of the most prominent issues pertaining to online notice today. 
Part III extrapolates core principles from the three legal models to 
articulate the elements of effective online notice.  This Note does not 
purport to outline an exhaustive list of essential elements.  Rather, 
these elements are intended to inform expectations of what effective 
notice should be in the online world.  These elements pertain to both 
the format and content of effective notice, as each of these aspects has 
a vital impact on consumer understanding of privacy terms.  Part III 
also discusses what tactics commercial websites should implement to 
sufficiently communicate the nature and scope of their data collection 
practices to consumers.  Moreover, this Part offers a greater analytical 
framework for addressing online notice problems. 
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I. THE LANDSCAPE OF NOTICE IN U.S. PRIVACY LAW 
A. The Federal Trade Commission and Notice and Choice 
Privacy law in the United States is often described as “sectoral”15 
because there is no one dominant source of privacy legislation.16  
Privacy laws operate like a patchwork quilt of various state law 
privacy torts, federal statutes, and administrative rules.17  In terms of 
government regulation, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the 
main federal agency that regulates the privacy space.18  Congress 
created the FTC in 1914 after it enacted the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (FTCA) to protect consumers and promote 
competition.19  In 1995, the FTC began to shift its focus to online 
consumer privacy issues,20 as the Internet was becoming more 
ubiquitous and the online marketplace was burgeoning.21  During this 
time, the FTC endorsed a policy of privacy self-regulation, in which it 
entrusted consumers to make their own decisions and judgments 
about their privacy.22  The FTC began to clarify and define this model 
of privacy self-regulation in a 2000 report.23  In the report, the FTC 
determined that commercial entities that collected consumers’ 
personally identifiable data must comply with the “fair information 
practice principles” of “Notice” and “Choice.”24  The FTC explained 
                                                                                                                                      
 15. Sectoral refers to the various sources of privacy law. 
 16. See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 910 (2009). 
 17. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common 
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014) (referring to U.S. privacy law as 
a “hodgepodge” of different “constitutional protections, federal and state statutes, 
torts, regulatory rules, and treaties”); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in 
Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 887–89 (2003). 
 18. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 587. 
 19. See Our History, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history [https://perma.cc/HD2D-5JZK]. 
 20. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 
(1998) 
 21. Id. at 40. (“The World Wide Web provides a host of opportunities for 
businesses to gather a vast array of personal information from and about consumers, 
including children. The online environment and the advent of the computer age also 
provide unprecedented opportunities for the compilation, analysis, and dissemination 
of such information.”). 
 22. See Gina Stevens, The Federal Trade Commission’s Regulation of Data 
Security Under Its Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices (UDAP) Authority, CONG. 
RES. SERVS. 3 (Sept. 11, 2014). 
 23. See Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices In 
The Electronic Marketplace A Report To Congress (May 2000) [hereinafter Privacy 
Online]. The Commission named four information practice requirements in total: 
Notice, Choice, Access, and Security. 
 24. See id. at 12. 
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that “Notice” required entities to give consumers “clear and 
conspicuous notice” of their information practices “before any 
personal information is collected.”25  The FTC stated that “Notice” 
was the “most fundamental” principle because it was a “prerequisite 
to implementing other fair information practice principles, such as 
Choice.”26  According to the principle of “Choice,” entities must give 
consumers options pertaining to how “any personal information 
collected . . . may be used for purposes beyond those necessary to 
complete a contemplated transaction.”27  Such “purposes” may 
include sharing consumer information with third parties or using it for 
marketing products.28 
The FTC premised the notice and choice model on the belief that 
companies would disclose their data collection practices to 
consumers, and consumers would self-manage their privacy by 
offering or denying their consent.29  The FTC asserted that privacy 
notices should be seen as a way to help consumers understand what 
information is collected about them and what is done with that 
information.30  In response to the FTC’s endorsement of a policy of 
privacy self-regulation, companies began to draft and post privacy 
policies on their commercial websites.31  Not only could these policies 
promote companies’ privacy practices, but could also help to “stave 
off” formal privacy regulations from Congress.32  Eventually, privacy 
policies became fairly ubiquitous in online commercial practice.33  In 
1998, only two percent of websites displayed privacy policies—by 
2000, nearly all websites featured them.34 
                                                                                                                                      
 25. Id. at 14. 
 26. Id. at 14. 
 27. Id. at 15. 
 28. Id. at 15-16. 
 29. See Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary But Not Sufficient: Standardized 
Mechanisms For Privacy Notice And Choice, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
273, 277-79 (2012). 
 30. See Howard Beales, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Prot., Privacy Notices and the 
Federal Trade Commission 2002 Privacy Agenda, 2002 WL 1713227 (Jan. 24, 2002), 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2002/01/privacy-notices-and-federal-trade-
commissions-2002-privacy-agenda [https://perma.cc/6ZGG-VYLA]. 
 31. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 592-95 (explaining that as a general 
matter, privacy policies describe websites’ terms of use and the nature of their data 
collection practices and privacy policies have the same binding force as any other 
legal contract and are usually featured on a separate webpage of a website). 
 32. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 594. 
 33. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 594. 
 34. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 594. 
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The self-regulatory regime of notice and choice remains in place 
today.35  Companies display disclosure statements pertaining to their 
data collection practices on their websites, and consumers can choose 
to read those disclosures and decide to consent to privacy terms.36  
Nevertheless, in 2000, the FTC reported that only about twenty 
percent of privacy policies that were studied implemented, at least in 
part, the criteria for the “Fair Information Practice Principles.”37  The 
FTC determined that privacy legislation, in addition to self-
regulation, would allow the “electronic marketplace to reach its full 
potential” and increase consumer confidence.38  Congress did not 
enact the recommended legislation, and the FTC began to 
increasingly rely on its statutory authority in order to protect 
consumers’ privacy.39 
The FTC’s statutory grant of power enables it to enforce the 
promises that companies make in their privacy policies.40  The FTC’s 
statutory authority arises from Section 5 of the FTCA.41  Section 5 
states that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, 
are . . . unlawful.”42  Pursuant to Section 5, the FTC files complaints 
against companies that engage in “unfair” or “deceptive” online 
practices.43  Though the FTC provides no enumerated examples of 
“unfair” and “deceptive” commercial practices, 44 the FTC interprets 
this language to include unfair and deceptive uses of consumers’ 
personal information.45  The FTC defines a deceptive practice as one 
that is a “representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead 
                                                                                                                                      
 35. See Cranor, supra note 29, at 277. 
 36. See Cranor, supra note 29, at 277. 
 37. See Privacy Online, supra note 23, at 12-13. 
 38. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN 
ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND 
POLICYMAKERS 8 (Dec. 2010) [hereinafter PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY]. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 598. 
 41. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
 43. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 598-99. 
 44. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 312 n.2 (“It is 
impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit 
to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all known unfair practices were 
specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin over again. 
If Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless 
task” (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No.1142, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914))). 
 45. Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-
divisions/division-privacy-and-identity [https://perma.cc/5EE8-AXUL]. 
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the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the 
consumer’s detriment.”46  Generally, a misleading act or broken 
promise, such as when companies breach their own privacy policies, 
will satisfy this language.47  The FTC maintains that an “unfair 
practice” is one that causes or is likely to cause “substantial injury” 
that is not “reasonably avoidable” or “outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers or competition.”48  An “unfair practice” need 
not entail a misleading act or broken promise.49  Rather, “unfair” 
practices include monetary, health or safety injuries.50 
B. The FTC’s Harm-Based Model 
In the early 2000s, the FTC focused on addressing harms to online 
consumers as a means of confronting greater privacy issues.51  Under 
its harm-based model, the FTC advanced online consumer protection 
claims in response to known privacy harms, which included data 
security breaches, identity theft, children’s privacy and spyware.52  
The number of FTC privacy enforcement actions has since grown 
steadily since the FTC first started to address and regulate privacy 
harms online.53  This growth is likely in response to companies’ new 
business models that collect and share online consumers’ personally 
identifiable information.  For example, online social media networks 
capture consumer data through personalized account profiles.54  
Likewise, location-based mobile applications, which provide 
consumers with uses like navigation services and weather reports, 
                                                                                                                                      
 46. FTC Policy Statement on Deception (1983), appended to Final 
Order, Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 
(1984), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm [https://perma.cc/E289-
HBV5]; 
 47. See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the 
Notice and Choice Framework, FORDHAM CTR. ON L. & INFO. POL’Y, 19 (2014), 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2015/01/Privacy-Harms-and-Notice-
and-Choice-01-12-2015-1-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YRL-LLK8].  Companies that do 
not have privacy policies, or fail to include certain provisions in their privacy policies, 
will not be charged with committing “deceptive” practices. Rather, companies must 
make positive statements in their privacy policies that mislead consumers’ 
expectations of privacy. Id. 
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
 49. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 47, at 19. 
 50. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 47, at 19. 
 51. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 9. 
 52. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 10. 
 53. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 600 (observing that the FTC brought nine 
privacy-related complaints in 2002, but brought twenty-four privacy-related 
complaints in 2012). 
 54. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 58. 
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gather satellite information on consumers’ geographic location.55  
More so, online behavioral advertisers market personalized products 
and services to consumers on the web by tracking consumers’ 
browsing habits over time.56 
Due to technological advancements and increased computing 
power, many companies are now capable of collecting a variety of 
consumer data in vast amounts.57  Some of this data may include 
personally identifiable information like consumers’ Social Security 
numbers, names, addresses, telephone numbers, credit or debit card 
numbers, bank account numbers, driver’s license numbers, or precise-
geolocation data.58 
Companies also profit from the consumer data that they collect and 
share. Companies may collect personal data and proceed to sell or 
rent it to third parties.59  They may also share this information with 
marketing affiliates in order to profile the behavior of users that visit 
their websites.60  Companies may also share this information with 
third party behavioral advertisers, which rely on consumer data to 
deliver personalized advertising.61  Companies often fail to disclose 
how long they retain consumer data after collection.62  However, 
some companies have retained consumer data for extended periods, 
and as seen with RadioShack, can even attempt to sell off their 
databases during bankruptcy.63 
As companies found new ways to collect and share a greater 
quantity and variety of data, the FTC filed a greater number of 
complaints in response to incidental privacy harms.64  Some of the 
alleged privacy harms cited in such complaints are linked with 
findings of insufficient notice.  For example, the FTC has filed 
                                                                                                                                      
 55. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 21. 
 56. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 21.  See generally 
Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and 
Consent, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ENGAGING DATA FORUM: THE FIRST 
INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON THE APPLICATION AND MANAGEMENT OF PERSONAL 
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION (2009). 
 57. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 21. 
 58. See In re HTC Am. Inc., FTC File No. 122 3049, No. C-4406, at 2 (F.T.C. June 
25, 2013). 
 59. See JOSHUA GOMEZ ET AL., KNOW PRIVACY, U.C. BERKELEY, SCHL. OF INFO. 
9 (Jun. 1, 2009). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 1. 
 62. See GOMEZ ET AL., supra note 59, at 25. 
 63. See Stech, supra note 1; see generally Brian Carroll, Price of Privacy: Selling 
Consumer Databases in Bankruptcy, 16 J. INTERACTIVE MKTG. 47 (2002). 
 64. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 600. 
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complaints against companies that fail to apprise consumers of their 
data collection practices.65  The FTC’s position is that without proper 
disclosure of data collection practices, consumers can not offer 
informed consent.66  Similarly, the FTC has filed complaints against 
companies for collecting consumer data without consumers’ 
knowledge.67  Some complaints allege instances of privacy harm when 
companies offer consumers installable software that, unbeknownst to 
consumers, collects personally identifiable information.68  FTC 
jurisprudence characterizes such covert collection as a “deceptive” 
under Section 5.69 
After filing a complaint, the FTC grants the respondents the option 
to settle or dispute the charges in administrative court.70  Most cases, 
however, are dropped or settled through the FTC’s consent orders, 
which are similar to settlement agreements.71  Though consent orders 
have the legal force of a contract between the FTC and respondent 
company, they sometimes, as a practical matter, have precedential 
value.72  Other companies that read these orders may opt to comply 
with them in order to avoid similar charges for privacy harms.73 
C. Statutory Protections of Privacy 
In addition to FTC enforcement actions, some federal laws also 
define and protect consumers’ privacy rights.  These statutes tend to 
be directed toward a specific industry or sector, and the FTC often 
                                                                                                                                      
 65. See e.g., Complaint, FTC v. Frostwire LLC, FTC File No. 112 3041, No. 111-
cv-236443 (F.T.C. Oct. 7, 2011); Complaint, In re Red Zone Inv. Grp., Inc. FTC File 
No. 112 3151, No. C-4396 (F.T.C. Apr. 11, 2013). 
 66. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 25-26. 
 67. See, e.g., Complaint, In re Aspen Way Enters., Inc., FTC File No. 1123151, 
No. C-4392 (F.T.C. Sept. 25, 2012) (collecting user data through secretly installed 
software on rental computers) [hereinafter In re Aspen Way Complaint]; Complaint, 
In re Epic Marketplace, Inc., File No. 112 3182, No. C-4389 (F.T.C. Dec. 5, 2012) 
(collecting browsing history data). 
 68. See Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 5. 
 69. See In re Aspen Way Complaint, supra note 67, at 5. 
 70. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 609. 
 71. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 610, 611 n.120 (noting that out of 154 
FTC complaints, only six lacked an accompanying settlement agreement). 
 72. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 607. 
 73. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 607 (“[A]lleged violations 
precipitating the consent orders reflect conduct the FTC believes is a violation of 
Section 5 . . .  and companies that engage in the same or similar conduct can expect 
an investigation and an allegation of illegal conduct from the FTC” (quoting Email 
from Chris Wolf, Dir., Privacy & Info. Mgmt. Grp., Hogan Lovells, to author (Mar. 
31, 2013, 11:21 AM) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)). 
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has authority to enforce them.74  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, for 
example, prohibits financial institutions from disclosing consumers’ 
non-public personal information to unaffiliated third parties.75  
Pursuant to the Act, financial institutions are obliged to provide 
notices of their privacy policies to consumers and to give consumers 
reasonable opportunity to opt-out of disclosing personal information 
to third parties.76  Compliant financial institutions must supply a 
notice statement of their privacy policies at the time a consumer 
relationship is established and at least once every twelve months 
thereafter.77  In addition to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the privacy 
rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) protects personally identifiable health information held or 
transmitted by health plans, insurers, and health providers.78  HIPAA 
prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information relating to 
patients’ identities or health status.79  Such information includes 
patients’ medical histories, payment records, Social Security numbers, 
names, addresses, and email addresses.80 
State laws also reserve special privacy rights for citizens.81  For 
instance, California’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 requires 
commercial websites that collect personally identifiable information 
to prominently post privacy policies and identify the kinds of data 
they collect from consumers.82  Under this law, websites must disclose 
any processes that they maintain for allowing consumers to review 
and change their personally identifiable information.83  California law 
not only regulates how websites may disclose their privacy practices, 
but also how they collect consumer data.84  California’s 
                                                                                                                                      
 74. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 4. 
 75. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801 et. seq. (2012). 
 76. 15 U.S.C. § 6802. 
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 6803. 
 78. HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 
and 42 U.S.C.); 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.103, 164.500 (2013). 
 79. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.103, 164.502 (2013). 
 80. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(2)(i) (2013).  Beyond the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act and 
HIPAA, other federal privacy statutes, such as the CAN-SPAM Act (which regulates 
how commercial entities send advertising emails to consumers), and the 
Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, were also enacted to 
protect privacy.  See 5 U.S.C. § 7701 et seq. (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq. (2012). 
 81. See e.g., California Invasion of Privacy Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 et seq. 
(West 2015). 
 82.  Online Privacy Protection Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575-22579 
(West 2015). 
 83. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(b)(2). 
 84. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575-22579. 
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Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act prohibits 
unauthorized users from knowingly copying software on consumers’ 
computers to surreptitiously collect personally identifiable 
information that “includes all or substantially all of the Web sites 
visited by an authorized user.”85  This law prohibits companies from 
installing spyware on the computers of unknowing consumers.86 
D. Common Law Notice Standards Applied to the Digital Age 
Principles of effective notice are central to privacy-related 
enforcement actions as well as to some federal and state privacy 
statutes.  Demonstrating effective notice is also critical throughout 
traditional legal areas, such as tort law,87 corporate law,88 and property 
law.89  The principle of notice is of particular importance to common 
law contracts.90  Contract theory is premised on the reasoning that 
parties have “freedom of contract.”91  The ability to enter contacts has 
traditionally been viewed as a “fundamental” right because it reflects 
parties’ liberties to control the disposition of their property and alter 
                                                                                                                                      
 85. Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 22947.2 (West 2015). 
 86. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22947.3 (West 2015). 
 87. See generally Bremer v. W. W. Smith, Inc., 126 Pa. Super. 408 (1937) (holding 
that proof of an injured party’s notice of hazardous conditions provided a defense in 
a premises liability suit). But see Mack v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 93 A. 618 (Pa. 1915) 
(holding defendant railroad had constructive notice of a grease spot due to the 
presence of footprints and was negligent because it did not apprise injured parties 
with a proper warning of hazardous conditions). 
 88. See generally In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 
(Del. Ch. 2009) (demonstrating Delaware courts’ reference to the “Red Flag” 
doctrine when imposing a duty to monitor upon directors who know or have reason 
to know of employees’ illegal conduct). 
 89. See 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 57 (2015) (providing adverse 
possession of land must be “open and notorious” in order to put landowners on 
sufficient notice of the trespass of their property). 
 90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS DEFINED § 1 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1981) (“A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of 
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way 
recognizes as a duty.”). 
 91. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 89 (1873) (holding that 
citizens have the right to contract without unreasonable government interference and 
that this right was protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  See generally David E. Bernstein, Freedom of Contract, GEO. MASON 
L. & ECON. RES. PAPER SERIES, No. 08-51 (2008), 
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/08-
51%20Freedom%20of%20Contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LAU-FJ7Z] (discussing 
the notion of freedom of contact and its place in U.S. Jurisprudence). 
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their legal relationships.92  By their very nature, contracts enable 
parties to structure an agreement on their own terms and attribute 
that agreement with legally binding status.93  However, if a party does 
not receive sufficient notice of a contract’s substantive terms at the 
formation stage, the agreement may be unenforceable.94  This is 
because parties may not be able to meaningfully assent to terms that 
they are unaware of or do not understand.95  Contracts are only 
enforceable if both parties mutually agree to their conditions.96 
Models of sufficient notice in common law contracts have shaped 
legal precedents in the privacy space.  In the landmark case Specht v. 
Netscape Communications Corp., then-Second Circuit Judge 
Sotomayor relied on traditional notice principles when concluding 
that that plaintiffs did not manifest consent to an arbitration clause in 
a browsewrap licensing agreement.97  In browsewrap agreements, 
websites display their terms of use at the bottom of a webpage.98  
                                                                                                                                      
 92. See David P. Weber, Restricting the Freedom of Contract: A Fundamental 
Prohibition, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 51, 56 (2013). 
 93. The process of contract formation entails the formal steps of offer, a 
bargained-for exchange (also known as consideration) and acceptance of the offer.  
Fiederlein v. Boutselis, 952 N.E.2d 847, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“The basic 
requirements for a contract include offer, acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of 
the minds of the contracting parties.”). 
 94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: REQUIREMENT OF A BARGAIN § 
17 (1981) (“[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a 
manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.”). 
 95. See Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. Of Cal., 495 F.3d 1062 (2007) 
(“[A]n offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless he knows of its existence.”) 
(quoting 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4:13 
(Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1990)); Trimble v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 234 A.D. 427, 431 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1932) (“An offer may not be accepted until it is made and brought to 
the attention of the one accepting.”). 
 96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: REQUIREMENT OF A BARGAIN § 
17. See also Motise v. Am. Online, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 2d 563, 564-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(holding that the plaintiff was not bound by AOL’s forum selection clause because 
the agreement failed to appear “on screen,” and the plaintiff was not given enough 
notice); Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over 
Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 613 (2007) (“The most obvious 
challenge to the enforceability of an online privacy policy as a binding contract is that 
the website visitor failed to assent to the agreement. A contract is only enforceable if 
both parties have manifested their assent to its terms”). 
 97. 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 98. See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(explaining in “‘browsewrap’ agreements . . . a website’s terms and conditions of use 
are generally posted at the bottom of the screen,” and that “‘[u] nlike a clickwrap 
agreement, a browsewrap agreement does not require the user to manifest assent to 
the terms and conditions expressly  . . . [a] party instead gives his assent simply by 
using the website.’”) (quoting Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366–
67 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)). 
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Online users do not have to expressly consent to browsewrap terms, 
as websites will typically interpret continued use of their services as 
acceptance of the agreement.99 
The plaintiffs in Specht downloaded SmartDownload software, 
which Netscape owned.100  The plaintiffs then sued Netscape after 
learning that the SmartDownload software surreptitiously gathered 
their online data and transmitted it to Netscape.101  Netscape then 
argued that the plaintiffs were bound to arbitrate these claims.102  In 
support of its contention, Netscape pointed to the existence of an 
arbitration provision in the SmartDownload browsewrap agreement, 
which Netscape argued plaintiffs had accepted by using the 
software.103 
The court held that the plaintiffs were not bound by the arbitration 
provision because they did not have sufficient notice of its 
existence.104  Judge Sotomayor, writing for the majority, observed that 
SmartDownload users would have had to scroll down to the very 
bottom of their computer screens in order to access the browsewrap 
licensing agreement.105  Even if an Internet user did scroll down to the 
bottom of the page, they would have only seen a hyperlink106 to the 
browsewrap agreement, rather than the licensing agreement itself.107  
Users would then have had to click on the hyperlink, located at the 
bottom of the screen, to be directed to a separate webpage that 
featured the licensing agreement and arbitration provision.108  Judge 
Sotomayor concluded that a “reasonably prudent” Internet user 
would not have had a basis for learning of or inquiring about the 
existence of the arbitration provision.109  She determined that the 
                                                                                                                                      
 99. See id. (“[I]n a pure—form browsewrap agreement, ‘the website will contain a 
notice that—by merely using the services of, obtaining information from, or initiating 
applications within the website—the user is agreeing to and is bound by the site’s 
terms of service’) (quoting Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F.Supp.2d 829, 837 
(S.D.N.Y.2012)). 
 100. Specht, 306 F.3d at 21. 
 101. Id. at 21. 
 102. Id. at 25. 
 103. Id. at 24. 
 104. Id. at 28, 30 (finding “[c]larity and conspicuousness of arbitration terms are 
important in securing informed assent”). 
 105. Id. at 23. 
 106. A hyperlink is “a highlighted word or picture in a document or Web page that 
you can click on with a computer mouse to go to another place in the same or a 
different document or Web page.”  See Hyperlink, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2016), 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hyperlink [https://perma.cc/52PJ-42JA]. 
 107. Specht, 306 F.3d at 23. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 30. 
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plaintiffs never manifested their “unambiguous assent” to the 
arbitration provision, as it was not sufficiently visible to them upon 
installing SmartDownload.110  The plaintiffs had no knowledge of the 
arbitration agreement, and therefore, did not have opportunity to 
accept or reject its terms.111  Because the plaintiffs never assented to 
the arbitration clause, their continued use of the SmartDownload 
software could not be viewed as an objective showing of their 
agreement.112 
II. EXPLORING THE ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE LEGAL NOTICE 
As discussed in Part I, principles of effective notice are critical to 
FTC enforcement actions,113 state and federal statutes,114 and 
enforceable contracts.115  Though notice is significant to many 
different areas of U.S. law, it is of particular importance to legal 
models that regulate commercial practices.  This Part examines the 
notice requirements of arbitration contracts in Part II.A, FDA 
labeling rules in Part II.B, and FTC enforcement actions in Part II.C.  
These three models respectively show standards of notice in 
businesses contracts, highly regulated industries, and commercial 
websites.  Furthermore, this Part explores how these models define 
effective notice, as well as the mechanisms each model has in place to 
ensure that consumers are fairly apprised of material terms and risks. 
A. Arbitration Clauses Viewed as Contracts: Actual and 
Constructive Notice 
As the Second Circuit demonstrated in Specht, a finding of 
effective notice and mutual assent is essential to enforcing an 
arbitration clause.116  Under federal law, courts are required to 
                                                                                                                                      
 110. Id. at 23, 29. (“[A]n offeree, regardless of apparent manifestation of his 
consent, is not bound by inconspicuous contractual provisions of which he is 
unaware, contained in a document whose contractual nature is not 
obvious.”) (quoting Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 101 Cal. Rptr. 
347, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).  See also Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco 
Contracting & Eng’g, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
 111. See Specht, 306 F.3d at 20. 
 112. Id. at 28. 
 113. See, e.g., Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 5. 
 114. See Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE §§ 22947-22947.6 et seq. (West 2015); 12 C.F.R. § 573.1 (2015); 45 C.F.R. § 
164.500 (2015). 
 115. See Specht, 306 F.3d at 32. 
 116. See Specht, 306 F.3d at 29. 
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“rigorously enforce” the terms of arbitration agreements.117  The 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) dictates that arbitration provisions 
shall be “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”118  This 
law dictates that courts are to interpret arbitration provisions 
according to general principles of contract doctrine.119  If the parties 
mutually agreed to an arbitration clause in a contract, courts are 
obliged to compel arbitration when future disputes fall within the 
scope of that provision.120 
Parties that arbitrate will often not be afforded procedural 
protections from formal discovery, the Federal Rules of Civil 
                                                                                                                                      
 117. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (“Th[e] 
text [of the Federal Arbitration Act] reflects the overarching principle that 
arbitration is a matter of contract. And consistent with that text, courts must 
‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according to their terms.”) (quoting Dean 
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985). 
 118. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  The FAA evinces Congress’s greater aim to create a 
“national policy favoring arbitration.” Southland Corp. v Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 
(1984). Granting arbitration provisions the status of binding contracts meant that 
courts were required to enforce them upon a showing of parties’ valid agreement.  
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).  The FAA’s 
legislative history suggests that Congress enacted it in response to lasting judicial 
hostility towards arbitration.  Prior to the FAA, there was a long tradition of courts 
refusing to enforce these provisions because it ousted them of jurisdiction. Preceding 
the Act’s enactment, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee commented on 
a lasting history, stemming from English Courts, of judicial hostility and suspicion 
towards arbitration. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. V. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 n.6 
(1985) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1924)). 
 119. See Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309. Arbitration clauses are often found 
in the boilerplate language of standard form contracts.  For example, Judicial 
Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS), an organization that provides 
arbitration and mediation services for different legal disputes, suggests this standard 
language for an arbitration clause in domestic commercial contracts: 
“Any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the 
breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity thereof, including the 
determination of the scope or applicability of this agreement to arbitrate, shall be 
determined by arbitration in [insert the desired place of arbitration] before 
[one/three] arbitrator(s) . . . Judgment on the Award may be entered in any court 
having jurisdiction. This clause shall not preclude parties from seeking provisional 
remedies in aid of arbitration from a court of appropriate jurisdiction.” 
JAMS Clause Workbook: A Guide to Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses for 
Commercial Contracts, JUD. ARB. & MEDIATION SERVICES (Apr. 1, 2015), 
http://www.jamsadr.com/clauses/ [https://perma.cc/2T7U-LZLL]. 
 120. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10 (“In enacting § 2 of the [F]ederal 
[Arbitration] Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and 
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of 
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”). 
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Procedure, or a jury.121  This is so because certain “fundamental” 
rights, such as the right to a jury trial, are considered alienable.122  
Parties are free to exchange negotiate these rights away by private 
agreement.123  Standardized arbitration clauses in form contracts 
provide a mechanism through which parties trade their right to a jury 
for consideration.124  In the employment arbitration agreements, for 
example, courts have identified employers’ promises to hire new 
employees as consideration to support an arbitration provision in an 
employee contract.125 
Without evidence of parties’ prior agreement, courts will refuse to 
enforce arbitration clauses.126  This is because one party may not 
coerce another into arbitration.127  Rather, parties must mutually 
assent to arbitrate and forgo their use of the judicial forum.128  
Application of common law contract principles reveals that notice is a 
critical aspect of this mutual assent.129  Formation of a valid contract 
requires offer and acceptance.130  Acceptance is inferred from context 
if an offeree receives notice of the offer and agrees or manifests 
                                                                                                                                      
 121. See Teresa Snider, The Discovery Powers of Arbitrators and Federal Courts 
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 101, 109 (1998) (“In addition 
to refusing to maintain jurisdiction over an arbitrable action for purposes of 
discovery, courts have also refused to apply the discovery procedures in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure to arbitrations where the parties have not contractually 
provided for those provisions to apply.”).  See also Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration 
Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional 
Rights, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 169 (2004). 
 122. Ware, supra note 121, at 169. 
 123. See Ware, supra note 121, at 169 (“One way to alienate the jury-trial right is 
to consent to a contract containing an arbitration clause . . . .). 
 124. See Martindale v. Sandvik, 173 N.J. 76, 89 (2002). 
 125. See, e.g., Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 368 (7th Cir. 
1999).  Courts have also held that the continued employment of at-will employees 
also constitutes sufficient consideration for an agreement to arbitrate. See Durkin v. 
CIGNA Prop. & Cas. Corp., 942 F. Supp. 481, 488 (D. Kan. 1996). 
 126. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 297 (2010) (“A 
court may order arbitration of a particular dispute only where the court is satisfied 
that the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.”) (emphasis in original).  See also 
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974). 
 127. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 479 (1989) 
(“Arbitration under the [Federal Arbitration] Act is a matter of consent, not 
coercion . . . .”). 
 128. See Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 297. 
 129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: CONDUCT AS MANIFESTATION 
OF ASSENT § 19(2) (1981). 
 130. Fiederlein v. Boutselis, 952 N.E.2d 847, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“The basic 
requirements for a contract include offer, acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of 
the minds of the contracting parties.”). 
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agreement to the offer.131  Common law concepts of offer and 
acceptance thereby inherently implicate notice, for without notice of 
an offer, a party cannot meaningfully assent to its terms.132 
Though notice of an offer is necessary for assent, courts do not 
require that parties receive actual notice of an arbitration clause.133  
When a party receives “actual notice,” that notice is directly or 
personally conveyed to them.134  In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. 
Casarotto, the Supreme Court struck down a Montana statute that 
was enacted to facilitate contacting parties’ actual notice of 
arbitration clauses.135  The Montana law required that on the first 
page of contracts subject to arbitration there be a notice statement 
that the contract was subject to arbitration, and that the statement be 
in capital and underlined letters.136  Arbitration clauses could be 
considered invalid under this state law if they did not meet the notice 
requirements.137  A Montana lower court upheld the special notice 
requirement, interpreting the law to require that “before arbitration 
agreements [be considered] enforceable, they be entered 
knowingly.”138 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted the 
Montana statute due to its special notice requirements.139  The Court 
held that states could not enact laws that singled out arbitration 
agreements by outlining unique grounds for invalidating them.140  The 
FAA instructed, as the court held, that arbitration agreements must 
have contract status, and they therefore could be vacated solely on 
contract grounds such as fraud or duress.141  The Court reasoned that 
creating new ways to vacate arbitration undermined Congress’ intent 
                                                                                                                                      
 131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: CONDUCT AS MANIFESTATION 
OF ASSENT § 19(2) 
 132. See Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration, 
44 BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 435 (2006). 
 133. See id. at 436; see generally Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 
(1996) (invalidating a Montana law which required notice of arbitration to be printed 
in “underlined capital letters on the first page of [a] contract”). 
 134. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “actual notice” as “[n]otice given directly to, 
or received personally by, a party.” Notice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 135. See Doctor’s Associates, 517 U.S. at 685. 
 136. See id. at 684. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 685. 
 139. Id. at 688. 
 140. Id. at 687 (“Courts may not, however, invalidate arbitration agreements under 
state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.”) (emphasis in original). 
 141. Id. 
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to put arbitration agreements upon the “same footing as other 
contracts.”142 
Because courts put arbitration agreements “on equal footing” with 
contracts, parties need not receive actual notice to be bound by their 
terms.143  As in common law contracts, parties’ constructive notice will 
often suffice to render arbitration agreements enforceable.144  A party 
receives “constructive notice” of an agreement when, given the 
specific facts or circumstance, a party had reason to know that certain 
terms existed and had the duty to apprise themselves of those 
terms.145  The requisites of constructive notice are outlined in F.D. 
Import & Export Corporation v. M/V REEFER SUN.146  In that case, 
the court determined that F.D. Import, a large commercial buyer of 
international fruit, was compelled to arbitrate with various suppliers 
and carriers.147  Though F.D. Import had no actual notice of the 
clause, the court held that it had received constructive notice, which 
was enough to compel arbitration.148  The court found that F.D. 
Import had constructive notice of the arbitration clause, despite the 
                                                                                                                                      
 142. Id. (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).  But see 
Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 1998 MT 326, ¶ 23 (1998) (holding that “[t]he 
FAA generally preempts state law which restricts the application of arbitration 
agreements. However, when a state law does not conflict with the FAA so as to 
frustrate the objectives of Congress, it is not necessarily preempted. State law may be 
applied in spite of the FAA’s preemptive effect “if that law arose to govern issues 
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally”) 
(quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93, n.9 (1987)).  See also Wells v. Tenn. 
Homesafe Inspections, LLC, No. M200800224-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 5234724, at *3 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that an arbitration clause was unenforceable because 
it was not separately signed or initialed by both parties, as required by state law). 
 143. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011); Buckeye 
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. 
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996). See also Bales, supra note 132, at 424. 
 144. See Steel Warehouse Co. v. Abalone Shipping Ltd. of Nicosai, 141 F.3d 234, 
237 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that parties were bound by an arbitration clause because 
they had constructive notice that it was incorporated into their agreement); F.D. Imp. 
& Exp. Corp. v. M/V REEFER SUN, 248 F. Supp. 2d 240, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“A 
party does not need actual notice to be bound by an arbitration agreement. 
Constructive notice is sufficient to create a binding arbitration agreement.”). 
 145. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “constructive notice” as “[n]otice arising by 
presumption of law from the existence of facts and circumstances that a party had a 
duty to take notice of, such as a registered deed or a pending lawsuit; notice 
presumed by law to have been acquired by a person and thus imputed to that 
person.” Notice, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). See also Steel Warehouse, 
141 F.3d at 237. (“Constructive notice can be defined, crudely, as a rule in which ‘if 
you should have known something, you’ll be held responsible for what you should 
have known.’”). 
 146. 248 F. Supp. 2d at 247. 
 147. Id. at 251. 
 148. Id. at 248. 
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fact that F.D. Import was never a signatory of the contract in which 
the arbitration clause appeared.149  Though only the ship owner and 
charterer signed the agreement, it was later incorporated into 
subsequent bills of lading.150  The reverse side of the bills of lading 
stated that it incorporated all terms of the previous contract, including 
the arbitration clause.151  The court held that the bill of lading was 
sufficient to place F.D. Import on constructive notice and to compel 
arbitration.152 
1. Contract Remedies for Insufficient Notice of Arbitration Clauses 
Though parties are not entitled to actual notice of arbitration, 
common law contract remedies may provide redress when notice of 
an arbitration clause is insufficient.153  Courts should not presume that 
parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute “unless there is ‘clea[r] and 
unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”154  A court’s determination 
of whether a dispute should be moved to arbitration depends on 
whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate and whether the 
dispute falls within the scope of that agreement.155  Nevertheless, 
parties may prevail in vacating an arbitration clause through a 
showing of insufficient notice.156  Parties may argue that without being 
offered fair notice of an arbitration clause, they could not manifest 
requisite consent to this contract term.157 
                                                                                                                                      
 149. Id. at 247-48. 
 150. Id.  A “bill of lading” is defined as a “document acknowledging the receipt of 
goods by a carrier or by the shipper’s agent and the contract for the transportation of 
those goods; a document that indicates the receipt of goods for shipment and that is 
issued by a person engaged in the business of transporting or forwarding goods.” Bill 
of Lading, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
 151. F.D. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 248 F. Supp. 2d at 248. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (holding 
that when an arbitration clause is valid, an arbitrator, rather than a court, has the 
deciding power over parties’ disputes).  But see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Local 8-766, Oil, 
Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, 600 F.2d 322, 324-25 (1st Cir. 1979) (providing 
that a court must hear questions of arbitrability, or the threshold issue of whether or 
not an arbitration clause is enforceable). 
 154. See First Options, 514 U.S. at  944 (citing AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Comm’ns. 
Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)) (alteration in original). 
 155. See First Options of Chi., Inc., 514 U.S. at  944-45. 
 156. See Campbell v. General Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 142, 147 
n.3 (D. Mass. 2004) (“[A]n employee’s knowledge of the [employer’s] offer is 
obviously a necessity for the inference of acceptance to hold.”); see Bales, supra note 
132, at 436-37. 
 157. See Campbell v. General Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 555 (1st 
Cir. 2005). 
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Contract defenses of unconscionability encompass underlying 
claims of insufficient notice and defective consent.158  In contract law, 
the doctrine of unconscionability consists of two branches: procedural 
unconscionability and substantive unconscionability.159  Though both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present to 
invalidate an agreement, and the more one is shown, the less the 
other is needed.160  Contracts that are substantively unconscionable 
tend to have unduly harsh or unreasonable terms.161  Agreements that 
are procedurally unconscionable, on the other hand, tend to be 
formed under unjust conditions, such as when one party has 
disproportionate bargaining power or fails to apprise an offeree of the 
contract’s terms.162  A showing of lack of notice and “surprise” is 
sometimes inherent to a procedural unconscionability analysis.163  
“Surprise” may occur when “supposedly agreed-upon terms of the 
bargain are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party 
seeking to enforce the disputed terms.”164 
A court may refuse to enforce a “surprise” arbitration clause if it 
was either buried in an agreement, or not sufficiently called to a 
party’s attention during the formation of a contract.165  For example, 
in Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., the court held that an 
arbitration clause was one of surprise because it was inconspicuously 
included in the twentieth paragraph of the twenty-three paragraph 
long agreement.166  The court noted that there was no separate 
signature in the contract for the arbitration clause, and the signature 
line was on an entirely separate page.167  Moreover, the arbitration 
                                                                                                                                      
 158. See Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (N.D. Cal. 
2013). 
 159. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., 36 Cal. 4th 148, 160 (2005); 
Unconscionability, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
 160. See Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 571, 579 (2007). 
 161. Unconscionability, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003) (“To 
determine whether the arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable the 
court must examine ‘the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the 
circumstances of the parties at that time.’ An inquiry into whether [an] arbitration 
agreement involves oppression or surprise is central to that analysis.”)  (quoting 
Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1329 (1999)). 
 164. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486 (Ct. App. 1982). 
 165. See Lau v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. CV 11-1940 MEJ, 2012 WL 
370557, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) (finding surprise because an arbitration clause 
was not separated from the rest of the page and was not on the page that required 
agreeing parties’ signatures). 
 166. 936 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 167. Id. 
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clause was neither highlighted nor outlined on the page in order to 
stand out to the reader.168  Thus, the court held that the arbitration 
agreement was unenforceable on the grounds of unfair surprise.169 
Arbitration clauses may also be unconscionable when a drafting 
party reserves the right to change the terms of arbitration without 
notice.170  In Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, the Fourth Circuit 
held that an arbitration clause in an employment contract was 
unconscionable because it reserved the right of employer, Hooters of 
America Inc. (“Hooters”), to unilaterally modify the arbitration 
terms in the post-agreement stage.171  According to its contract terms, 
Hooters could modify the rules of employee arbitration “in whole or 
in part,” whenever it wished, “without notice” to the employee.172  
Further, Hooters reserved the right to expand the scope of an 
employee arbitration to cover matters not already listed in the initial 
arbitration agreement, whether or not it related to an employee’s 
initial claim.173  Because Hooters maintained the right to change the 
terms of arbitration agreements as it wished, the court held that the 
arbitration agreement was one-sided and unenforceable.174  The 
ability to modify arbitration terms in the post-agreement stage, 
without apprising employees with notice, impermissibly allowed 
Hooters to dominate arbitration outcomes.175 
                                                                                                                                      
 168. Id.  Note that the district court’s holding in Zaborowski rests alongside the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996), 
because in Doctor’s Associates, the Supreme Court struck down a state law that 
specifically demanded special notice requirements for arbitration clauses. The FAA 
made no such demands, and federal law therefore preempted the state law. In 
Zaborowski, however, the district court found that an agreement was procedurally 
unconscionable under common law contract grounds, as its terms were visibly 
inconspicuous to the agreeing party. 
 169. See Zaborowski, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 1152. 
 170. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939, 941 (4th Cir. 1999). A 
contract has also been found to be invalid due to lack of acceptance when one party 
unilaterally modifies a contract.  See Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of 
Cal., 495 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Indeed, a party can’t unilaterally change 
the terms of a contract; it must obtain the other party’s consent before doing so. This 
is because a revised contract is merely an offer and does not bind the parties until it is 
accepted.”). 
 171. 173 F.3d at 939, 941. 
 172. Id. at 939. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 941. 
 175. Id. (“By promulgating this system of warped rules, Hooters so skewed the 
process in its favor that [plaintiff] has been denied arbitration in any meaningful 
sense of the word. To uphold the promulgation of this aberrational scheme under the 
heading of arbitration would undermine, not advance, the federal policy favoring 
alternative dispute resolution. This we refuse to do.”). 
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2. Arbitration Clauses Viewed as Waivers: The “Voluntary and 
Knowing” Standard 
Some federal courts equate arbitration provisions with waivers of 
legal rights.176  When parties agree to arbitrate, these courts argue, 
they waive certain legal rights by default.177  The agreeing parties lose 
access to the traditional judicial forum for their dispute.178  Instead of 
a judge and jury, one or more arbitrators determine the outcome of a 
case.179  Arbitrators are not bound by the same rules and procedures 
as judges, and they do not have to comply with the Rules of Civil 
Procedure or Rules of Evidence during the arbitration.180  Moreover, 
fact-finding in arbitration proceedings is less thorough and more 
limited than that in the judicial setting.181  Fact-finding in arbitration 
need not include sworn testimony, cross-examination, or discovery.182 
In addition to waiving the right to a jury trial, parties to an 
arbitration agreement relinquish other procedural and substantive 
protections.  For example, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Supreme Court determined that 
arbitration procedures are capable of vindicating parties’ federal 
statutory rights.183  It held that parties are free to stipulate that an 
arbitrator will have deciding power over federal statutory claims, and 
                                                                                                                                      
 176. See Bales, supra note 132, at 449; Christine M. Reilly, Comment, Achieving 
Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 
at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1210 (2002). 
 177. Among these rights is the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. U.S. 
CONST. amend VII. See RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 
(N.D. Tex. 2002). The right to a jury trial also depends on the type of legal 
proceeding involved.  In administrative hearings, for example, there is no right to a 
jury trial.  See Ware, supra note 121, at 169. 
 178. See Reilly, supra note 176, at 1211. 
 179. See Reilly, supra note 176, at 1210. 
 180. See Reilly, supra note 176, at 1210. 
 181. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974) (“[T]he 
factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial factfinding. The 
record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of 
evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as 
discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are 
often severely limited or unavailable.”). 
 182. Id. at 57-58. 
 183. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638, 
(1985). Since Mitsubishi, 
the Supreme Court has held that claims arising under federal statutes such as anti-
trust laws, securities law, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
are appropriate for arbitration.  See generally Richard E. Speidel, Consumer 
Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute (Mandatory) Arbitration Outlived 
Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998). 
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are free to stipulate if that arbitrator should apply federal law.184  The 
Court noted that parties have the freedom to determine the scope and 
procedure of their own arbitration agreements.185  It concluded that 
“so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its 
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,” a federal statute may 
“continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”186 
The Supreme Court held that arbitration provisions do not prevent 
individuals from asserting statutory rights.187  Nonetheless, some 
circuit courts require proof of parties’ “knowing” waiver of their legal 
rights before enforcing arbitration agreements.188  The Ninth189 and 
Sixth Circuits,190 for instance, have expressly adopted the “knowing” 
agreement waiver standard, while courts in the Seventh Circuit have 
endorsed it.191  Courts in these Circuits require proof of parties’ 
informed consent to waiving constitutional or statutory rights prior to 
compelling arbitration.192  Under this standard, parties cannot agree to 
arbitrate and lose access to a judicial forum without receiving explicit 
notice of the constitutional or statutory rights that they may be 
signing away.193 
                                                                                                                                      
 184. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628  (“Nothing . . .  prevents a party from 
excluding statutory claims from the scope of an agreement to arbitrate.”). 
 185. Id. at 628. 
 186. Id. See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-28 
(1991) (holding that an employee’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
are appropriate for arbitration because Congress did not intend to exclude 
arbitration as a form of dispute resolution under the statute). 
 187. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628. 
 188. See Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 381 (6th Cir. 
2005); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 2005).  In the 
context of criminal law, defendants must “knowingly and intelligently” relinquish 
their Fifth Amendment due process rights in order for waiver to be valid. See 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
 189. See Lindgren v. Pub. Storage, 290 Fed. Appx. 971, 972 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 
Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 190. The Sixth Circuit has articulated a test for assessing the validity of parties’ 
waivers. The court evaluates whether parties knowingly and voluntarily waived their 
rights according to “(1) plaintiff’s experience, background, and education; (2) the 
amount of time the plaintiff had to consider whether to sign the waiver, including 
whether the employee had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer; (3) the clarity of 
the waiver; (4) consideration for the waiver; as well as (5) the totality of the 
circumstances.”  See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 668 (2003) 
(quoting Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 583 )6th Cir. 1995)). 
 191. See Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 
1997); see also Bales, supra note 132, at 449-50. 
 192. See Walker., 400 F.3d at 380. 
 193. See Tanya J. Axenson, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Statutory Rights: 
The Legal Landscape After Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corporation, 119 F.3d 
756 (1997), 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 271, 281-82 (1998). 
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The Ninth Circuit described the core requirements of the 
“knowing” agreement standard in Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper 
Corp.194  In Nelson, the court applied the “knowing” agreement 
standard and held that an employee could not be compelled to 
arbitrate his Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim.195  The 
appellant’s employer in Nelson gave him an employee handbook that 
contained an arbitration provision.196  After receiving the handbook, 
the appellant returned a form to his employer that stated that he 
agreed to “read and understand” the handbook.197  A year after the 
appellant received the employee handbook, he was terminated from 
his position, and filed a claim alleging discrimination under the ADA 
against his former employer in federal court.198  The district court 
granted summary judgment for the defendant employer, upholding 
the arbitration agreement in the Employee Handbook.199 
The Ninth Circuit determined that the arbitration clause was not 
enforceable because the appellant did not knowingly agree to waive 
his statutory rights.200  Examining the history and language of the 
ADA, the court determined that Congress intended that employees 
knowingly consent prior to waiving their ADA rights, protections, 
and remedies.201  Furthermore, the court held that though the 
appellant agreed to “read and understand” the handbook, he did not 
agree to be bound by its terms.202  Neither the appellant’s employer 
nor the handbook informed the appellant that his agreement to “read 
and understand” his employer’s terms would translate to a waiver of 
his statutory civil rights.203 
Finally, the Nelson court held that continued employment was not 
enough to put the appellant on notice that he had waived his statutory 
rights.204  Rather, the Ninth Circuit concluded that when employees 
                                                                                                                                      
 194. 119 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 195. Id. 762. 
 196. Id. at 758. 
 197. Id. at 761. 
 198. Id. at 759. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 762.  The Nelson court aligned with a prior Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir. 1994), which held that 
employees did not consent to arbitrate their Title VII sexual harassment claims 
because they did not do so “knowingly.”  The Lai court determined that the 
plaintiffs’ employee registration forms failed to notify them that future sexual 
discrimination claims in particular would be subject to arbitration. Id. 
 201. Nelson, 119 F.3d at 761 n.9. 
 202. Id. at 761. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 762. 
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bargain to waive their rights to a judicial forum, they must waive 
those rights in an express and explicit manner.205  The ”unilateral 
promulgation by an employer of arbitration provisions” in the 
employee handbook failed to meet the standard of a “knowing” 
waiver of ADA protections.206  The court determined that to arbitrate 
statutory claims, employers must inform employees of the existence 
of arbitration clauses and specifically refer to the rights that 
employees will waive if they agree to them.207  Otherwise, arbitration 
agreements would be unenforceable, as employees would 
unknowingly surrender their guaranteed statutory privileges and 
remedies.208 
B. FDA Labeling Rules  
Notice is critical in the domain of arbitration clauses and 
commercial contracts.  Proof that parties were on actual or 
constructive notice of an arbitration agreement may evince their 
consent to arbitrate future disputes and waive their access to a judicial 
forum.  Similarly, notice is critical to ensuring consumer safety in 
highly regulated industries.209  The FDA regulates how OTC drug 
manufacturers convey notice to consumers.210  Through its OTC drug-
labeling rule, the FDA uses product packaging as a mechanism for 
effective notice.211  The FDA regulates the content and format of 
OTC drug labels with standardized requirements so that labels are 
readable and rapidly inform consumers of pertinent drug 
information.212  This Note ultimately argues that if some features of 
OTC drug labels were to be extrapolated and applied to online 
privacy policies, then online privacy polices might become more 
legible and digestible to the average consumer. 
                                                                                                                                      
 205. Id. at 762 (“Any bargain to waive the right to a judicial forum for civil rights 
claims, including those covered by the ADA, in exchange for employment or 
continued employment must at the least be express: the choice must be explicitly 
presented to the employee and the employee must explicitly agree to waive the 
specific right in question. That did not occur in the case before us.”). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 762. 
 208. See Axenson, supra note 193, at 282. 
 209. See Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the “Right to Know” 
from the “Need to Know’ About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 
293, 321 (1994) (discussing required warnings on FDA regulated drug products). 
 210. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.66 (2014). 
 211. See Noah, supra note 209, at 320-21. 
 212. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.66 
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1. Standardized Content in FDA Labeling Rules 
Though different courts have unique standards of notice, the 
FDA’s notice requirements for OTC drug labels are highly uniform 
and regulated.213  In 1999, the FDA published a final regulation that 
established standardized labeling requirements for OTC drugs.214  The 
regulation detailed both the content and format of OTC drug labels, 
and set forth a general product-labeling outline for presenting drug 
information to consumers.215  Prior to the rule, the FDA found that 
variations between OTC drug products in areas of label content (i.e., 
differences in wording of drug warnings and directions for use) and 
label format (i.e., differences in headings and typeface) increased 
consumer confusion over similar OTC drugs on the market.216  
Because manufacturers presented product information differently, 
consumers had difficulty comparing drugs and deciding which were 
most appropriate for their needs.217 
The 1999 rule aimed to improve OTC labeling by dictating 
requirements for drug label format.218  The rule requires warnings to 
be conveyed in the form of short, directive statements.219  For 
example, when an OTC drug might be dangerous to children, the 
FDA provides that a manufacturer display in bold type “[k]eep out of 
reach of children” and “‘[a]sk a doctor before use if the child 
has’ . . . all warnings for persons with certain preexisting 
conditions . . . and all warnings for persons experiencing certain 
symptoms.”220  The FDA determined that drug warnings in the form 
of curt and action-oriented commands would be more readable, 
direct, and understandable to consumers.221  The FDA asserted that 
these brief directives would enhance warning clarity by conveying to 
consumers the precise course of action they should take for safe 
product use.222  The FDA found that, unlike densely worded text, 
shorter sentences with simple terminology reduced consumers’ 
                                                                                                                                      
 213. See id. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(d). 
 216. See Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Proposed Labeling Requirements, 62 
Fed. Reg. 9024, 9027 (Feb. 27, 1997). 
 217. See id. at 9028. 
 218. See id. at 9027-28. 
 219. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.66. 
 220. 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(c)(5)(iv), (x). 
 221. See Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. 
13254, 13254 (Mar. 17, 1999). 
 222. See id. at 13254-55. 
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processing time.223  With less text on a label, consumers would not be 
overwhelmed with information and would be able to read and 
understand labels at faster rates.224 
This rule prescribed the content of OTC drug labels and the 
sequence in which that content must be conveyed.225  It required that 
an OTC drug label display information under the headings in the 
exact sequence of “active ingredients,” “uses,” “warnings,” 
“directions,” and “inactive ingredients.”226  The FDA determined that 
by requiring manufacturers to present content in this uniform order, 
consumers would become familiar with this routine sequence and 
know where to find a specific drug fact on any given OTC label.227  By 
organizing drug facts in a formulaic and uniform scheme, drug labels 
could shape consumer expectations for what information they could 
find on a label and where on the label they could locate it.228  The 
FDA concluded that standardizing the sequence of drug label content 
would enable consumers to accurately compare different brands of 
OTC drug products.229  A uniform order of label content enabled 
consumers to perform side-by-side comparisons, identify differences 
between products, and readily determine which products were safest 
for use.230 
2. User-friendly Formatting 
Prior to the 1999 rule, the FDA discovered that some common 
formatting practices diminished the legibility of OTC drug labels.231  
The FDA observed that labels with compressed text and small type 
letters contributed to consumer comprehension problems.232  The 
FDA concluded that such labels required consumers to possess a 
greater than normal visual acuity in order to read and understand 
displayed product information.233  Additionally, the FDA determined 
that even if consumers could see the information on drug labels, 
                                                                                                                                      
 223. Id. at 13255. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(c) (2014). 
 226. Id. 
 227. See Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. 
at 13255. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See id. at 13277. 
 231. See Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Proposed Labeling Requirements, 62 
Fed. Reg. 9024, 9027-28 (Feb. 27, 1997). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
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compressed paragraphs of text caused consumers to lose interest in 
the information presented.234 
The 1999 rule required OTC drug label content to be displayed in a 
tabular outline.235  Within this outline, the FDA requires drug 
manufacturers to describe drug information in shorter phrases under 
standardized, bold-type title headings.236  As opposed to displaying 
paragraphs of text, the rule requires drug manufactures to “chunk” 
similar groups of information together on the label.237  This 
“chunked” format entailed separating discrete units of related label 
information (i.e., drug warnings, drug directions, active ingredients) in 
list form.238  The FDA determined that organizing label information in 
a chunked structure improved consumers’ reading and processing 
abilities.239  Using simpler terminology, shorter sentences, and 
conspicuous headings tended to reduce consumers’ “cognitive load” 
by creating less demand on consumers’ memories.240  Finally, the 
FDA concluded that in comparison to paragraphs, the chunked 
format had greater eye appeal and was more likely to draw 
consumers’ attention to the information presented.241 
User-friendly titles, headings, and subheadings are a central aspect 
of the 1999 FDA rule.242  These formatting elements advance the 
FDA’s overarching aim to make information easier to locate and 
                                                                                                                                      
 234. Id. at 9028. 
 235. See Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. 
at 13265-66. 
 236. Id. at 13265. 
 237. Id. at 13255. 
 238. Id. at 13265-66. 
 239. Id. at 13255.  See generally Michael S. Wogalter & Mica P. Post, Printed 
Tutorial Instructions: Effects Of Text Format And Screen Pictographs On Human-
Computer Task Performance, 89 PROCEED. INTERFACE 133 (1989) (finding that when 
shown information in the form of paragraph and lists with screen pictographs, 
participants in a study made fewer errors and help requests, and completed tasks in 
shorter time when shown lists); Lawrence T. Frase & Bary J. Schwartz, 
Typographical Cues That Facilitate Comprehension, 71 J. EDUC. PSYCHOLOGY 197, 
204-05 (1979) (finding that grouping information facilitates readers’ search for 
information as well as their acquisition of knowledge); William J. Vigilante, Jr. & 
Michael S. Wogalter, Over-The-Counter (OTC) Drug Labeling: Format Preferences, 
PROCEED. HUM. FACTORS & ERGONOMICS SOC’Y 43RD ANN. MEETING 104 (1999), 
http://www.safetyhumanfactors.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/163Vigilante_Wogalter1999.pd [https://perma.cc/6YF2-
CT5T] (stating that chunking information into groups can foster improved reading 
comprehension). 
 240. Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. at 
13255. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 13254. 
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read.243  Titles and headings provide consumers with “visual cues” that 
could draw their eyes to important categories of information on a 
drug label.244  To enhance uniform compliance with its headings 
regulations, the FDA provides specific and detailed requirements in 
the rule.245  For example, the rule requires that headings be displayed 
in bold italic type and subheadings displayed in bold type.246 
The 1999 rule also regulates the size of typeface on OTC drug 
labels.247  Prior to the rule, the FDA found that labels were cramped 
and difficult for many consumers to read.248  It concluded that small 
type, text-heavy labels demanded a greater than normal visual acuity 
from consumers.249  Moreover, the FDA found that only forty-eight 
percent of the population could see the typical type size of label 
text.250  To improve the legibility of OTC labels, the FDA prescribes 
that the letter height or type size for subheadings and all other 
information should be no smaller than 6-point type.251  According to 
the FDA, this larger type size improves much of the general 
population’s ability to physically see the text on product labels.252  
Increased visibility also improves consumers’ reading and 
                                                                                                                                      
 243. See id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(d)(5)-(6) (2014). 
 246. 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(d)(3). 
 247. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.66(d)(2), (4), (10)(ii). 
 248. See Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Proposed Labeling Requirements, 62 
Fed. Reg. 9024, 9024 (Feb. 27, 1997). 
 249. See id. at 9028.  To support its proposal, the Administration cited a study that 
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compression” on the legibility of OTC drug labels among the geriatric population and 
found that “a significant number of the elderly population could not adequately see 
the print on certain OTC product labels due in part to the small type sizes and high 
degree of horizontal compression.  Id. (citing Richard K. Watanabe, The Ability of 
the Geriatric Population to Read Labels on Over-the-Counter Medication 
Containers, J. THE AM. OPTOMETRIC ASS’N., 65:32-37 (1994)).  The Administration 
also cited another study, which  “evaluated the visual acuity needed to read 25 
marketed OTC drug product labels” and found that the majority of labels demanded 
a much higher than normal visual acuity.  Id.  (citing Greg A. Holt et al., OTC Labels: 
Can Consumers Read and Understand Them?, AM. PHARMACY, NS30:51-54 (1989)). 
 250. Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. at 
13265 (explaining that prior to the rule, the National Drug Manufactures Association 
recommended a minimum type size of 4.5, which the FDA found that only 48% of 
the public could actually read).  See also Vigilante & Wogalter, supra note 239, at 104 
(asserting that people are less likely to expend the mental energy on reading 
information on densely printed labels). 
 251. 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(d)(2). 
 252. Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. at 
13264. 
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comprehension of product labels.253  The FDA determined that when 
consumers are more confident about their ability to read a product 
label, they are more capable of processing and understanding that 
label’s information.254 
3. Symbolic Visual Cues 
The FDA endorses the use of symbolic cues on OTC labels as a 
means of conveying information.255  For example, the FDA affirms 
that bullet points could be used to introduce “chunks” of information 
without distracting or confusing consumers.256  By separating drug 
facts into discrete chunks, bullets on OTC drug labels convey key 
information without overwhelming consumers.257  An FDA guidance 
document explains how bullets may be used on drug labels.258  The 
guidance document states that drug labels should list separate 
statements under bullets, rather than consolidating the statements 
into longer paragraphs.259  For example, instead of presenting user 
directions in a large block of text, the guidance document states that 
phrases such as “shake well” and “children under 2 years: ask a 
doctor” may be positioned under bullets in an easier to read format.260 
The FDA permits, but does not require, OTC drug manufacturers 
to communicate drug information through pictograms.261  The FDA 
defines a “pictogram” as “a pictorial representation of some object 
used to symbolize information.”262  The FDA also provides for the use 
of pictograms outside of the OTC drug context.263  For instance, the 
Administration requires that powdered infant formula manufacturers 
display pictures to represent the three-step process involved in safely 
preparing and using the product.264  It determined that pictures, rather 
than words, would enhance the clarity of the preparation 
                                                                                                                                      
 253. See id. at 13254. 
 254. See id. at 13257. 
 255. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(d)(4). 
 256. Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. at 
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Entity Compliance Guide), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 2009 WL 1887337 (May 2009). 
 259. Id. at *5. 
 260. Id. at *9. 
 261. Id. at *11. 
 262. Id. 
 263. See 21 C.F.R. § 107.20 (2014). 
 264. Id. 
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instructions.265  The FDA further recognized that many caregivers and 
health professionals might not be able to speak or read English.266  
Showing the product directions via images would reach a wider 
audience and help ensure that consumers could properly dilute the 
formula regardless of reading level.267 
C. FTC Enforcement Actions 
Like the FDA, the FTC exercises its administrative authority to 
regulate notice in the commercial domain.268  FTC enforcement 
actions have shaped the contours of U.S. privacy law, and inform 
legal standards of notice in the present digital age.269  While 
identifying the different categories of FTC Section 5 privacy actions, 
this Note relies on the typology of underlying privacy harms 
developed by the Fordham Law Center for Law and Information 
Policy (CLIP).270  CLIP has categorized FTC actions according to the 
most frequently asserted privacy harms in FTC complaints271 and 
classified FTC actions as relating to four distinct privacy harms: (1) 
unauthorized disclosure of personal information, discussed in Part 
II.C.1;272 (2) surreptitious collection of personal information, 
discussed in Part II.C.2;273 (3) failure to secure personal information, 
discussed in Part II.C.3;274 and (4) unlawful retention of personal 
information, discussed in Part II.C.4.275 
                                                                                                                                      
 265. See Infant Formula; Labeling Requirements, 48 Fed. Reg.  31880-01, 31883 
(July 12, 1983). 
 266. See id. 
 267. See id. 
 268. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 585-86 (asserting that FTC privacy 
actions provide a basis for modern U.S. privacy jurisprudence). 
 269. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 606 (“The FTC has essentially been 
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 270. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 47, at 20. 
 271. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 47, at 20.  Due to the fact that the FTC can 
only act pursuant to its statutory authority, enforcement actions must “fit” within the 
scope of Section 5’s statutory language of an “unfair” or “deceptive” practice. In its 
study, CLIP looked beyond FTC’s characterizations of certain practices as “unfair” 
or “deceptive” and studied the underlying privacy harms asserted in the 
Commission’s complaints. CLIP explained that “[t]his approach looked to the true 
substance of the wrongful event rather than the way a claim was formulated to fit 
within the existing constraints of the legal landscape.” Reidenberg, et al., supra note 
47, at 20. 
 272. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 47, at 21. 
 273. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 47, at 22. 
 274. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 47, at 23. 
 275. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 47, at 24. 
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1. Unauthorized Disclosure of Personal Information 
Under the “unauthorized disclosure” class of FTC actions, websites 
disclose users’ personal information to third parties without first 
notifying users or obtaining their consent.276  An unauthorized 
disclosure occurs either when a consumer is not notified that his or 
her data is shared with a third party, or when a consumer is misled 
about how or for what purposes his or her data is collected.277  The 
FTC Complaint for In re GeoCities, demonstrates the privacy harms 
that may result from unauthorized disclosures.278  In this action, the 
FTC determined that GeoCities committed a “deceptive practice” 
because it misrepresented its data collection and sharing practices to 
consumers.279 
GeoCities hosted different web pages that provided its members 
with personal home pages, email addresses, and online children’s 
clubs.280  The GeoCities membership form collected “mandatory” 
information, including first and last name, zip code, e-mail address, 
gender, date of birth, and “optional” information, such as education 
level, income, marital status, occupation, and interests.281  Geocities 
users could also opt to receive “special offers” from other 
companies.282  Though the Geocities privacy statement claimed, “[w]e 
assure you . . . we will NEVER give your personal information to 
anyone without your permission,” the company actually disclosed, 
rented, and sold users’ personally identifiable information to third 
party advertisers for the purposes of targeted advertising.283  The 
shared information also included data that GeoCities collected from 
children.284  The FTC determined that by failing to notify members 
regarding how it collected and shared personal data with advertisers, 
GeoCities committed a Section 5 deceptive practice.285  Beyond its 
failure to disclose the nature of its data collection and sharing, 
GeoCites actively misled consumers with its privacy statements, 
                                                                                                                                      
 276. See e.g., Frostwire Complaint, supra note 65; HTC America Complaint, supra 
note 65; Red Zone Complaint, supra note 65. 
 277. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 47, at 21-22. 
 278. See generally Complaint, In re GeoCities, FTC File No. 9823015, No. C-3850 
(F.T.C. Feb. 5, 1999). 
 279. Id. at 2-5. 
 280. Id. at 1. 
 281. Id. at 2. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 3. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 4-5. 
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which stated that personal data would not be transmitted to third 
parties without users’ consent. 286 
The FTC has also filed complaints against companies that failed to 
apprise consumers of how personal data was appropriated.287  In In re 
Facebook, Inc., the FTC filed a complaint against Facebook for 
failing to disclose how it used its members’ personal profile 
information.288  According to the FTC complaint, Facebook claimed 
that it never shared users’ personal data with advertisers without their 
consent,289 but stated that it only shared “aggregate and anonymous 
data” with advertisers so that Facebook’s advertisers could generate 
more effective advertisements.290 
The FTC also found that Facebook failed to notify consumers of 
material privacy policy changes that increased the visibility of users’ 
personal information to third parties.291  Under its new privacy policy, 
Facebook retroactively applied changes to members’ accounts 
without their consent and disclosed parts of Facebook profiles that 
were formerly under privacy settings.292  As with GeoCities, the FTC 
determined that this lack of disclosure constituted a Section 5 
deceptive practice.293  By failing to disclose its practices, Facebook 
promoted false expectations of privacy among its members.294 
2. Surreptitious Collection of Personal Information 
The FTC has also filed complaints against companies for failing to 
inform consumers when and how they collect personal data.295  
Sometimes, websites that surreptitiously collect personal data 
partially disclose their collection practices to users.296  However, such 
disclosures may be inadequate when websites fail to notify users of 
the true scope of the information they collect, or how they acquire 
                                                                                                                                      
 286. See id. at 3. 
 287. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 47, at 21-22. 
 288. See generally Complaint, In re Facebook, Inc., FTC File No. 0923184,  No. C-
4365 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012). 
 289. Id. at 12. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 9. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 19. 
 294. See id. at 14. 
 295. See, e.g., In re Aspen Way Complaint, supra note 67 (collecting user data by 
remotely operating website users’ webcams on their personal computers); In re Epic 
Marketplace, Inc. Complaint, supra note 67 (collecting users data by tracking their 
browsing histories). 
 296. See, e.g., Complaint at 5, United States v. In re Path, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 
1223158 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
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that information.297  For example, in In re Upromise, Inc., Upromise, 
an online service that offered college savings to members, 
clandestinely collected users’ data through its downloadable 
“Turbosaver Toolbar.”298  Upromise stated to users that the Toolbar 
collected information about websites that they visited in order to 
present savings opportunities tailored to their interests.299 
The FTC determined that the Toolbar’s data collection practices 
went beyond the scope of what Upromise disclosed to users.300  The 
FTC found that the Toolbar collected users’ passwords and 
usernames, information about every website they visited, and the 
links that they clicked.301  The Toolbar also collected information 
from users’ interactions on secured webpages such as banks and 
online retailers.302  As a result, the Toolbar gathered users’ financial 
account numbers, credit card numbers, social security numbers, and 
security codes.303  The FTC found that without special software, or 
technical expertise, consumers had no means of discovering 
Upromise’s true data collection practices.304  The FTC concluded that 
Upromise’s data collection constituted an unfair practice.305  The true 
nature of Upromise’s collection practices, which included gathering 
sensitive financial data, actually put users at risk for identity theft and 
other consumer harms.306 
In a later enforcement action, In re ScanScout, the FTC articulated 
concrete standards for enhancing consumer notice of data collection 
practices.307  The FTC initially filed the complaint against the video 
advertising network ScanScout due to its use of HTTP cookies.308  
ScanScout stated that consumers could “opt-out” of receiving cookies 
                                                                                                                                      
 297. Id. at 9. 
 298. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 2. A “toolbar” is “a row of buttons on 
a display screen that are clicked on to select various functions in a software 
application or web browser.”  Toolbar, DICTIONARY.COM (2016), 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/toolbar [https://perma.cc/UX3N-Y33N]. 
 299. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 2. 
 300. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 5. 
 301. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 2. 
 302. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 2-3. 
 303. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 3. 
 304. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 2. 
 305. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 6. 
 306. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 3. 
 307. See Complaint at 2, In re ScanScout, Inc., File No. 102-3185, No. C-4344 
(F.T.C. Dec. 14, 2011). 
 308. See id. (providing “HTTP cookies . . . are small text files that can be used to 
collect and store information about a user’s online activities”). 
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by changing their browser settings.309  Nonetheless, flash cookies, 
which were stored in a unique location on consumers’ computers, 
could not be deleted in this way.310  The FTC determined that 
ScanScout violated Section 5 for making false and misleading 
statements to consumers.311 
In the ScanScout decision and order, the FTC described how 
consumers should be apprised of the choice to opt-out of data 
collection practices.312  The FTC ordered ScanScout to place a “clear 
and prominent notice” on its homepage that disclosed that it collected 
consumer data through targeted advertising.313  Next to the disclosure, 
the FTC required ScanScout to include a link that consumers could 
click on to opt-out of the data collection.314  The order provided that 
the link should lead consumers directly to a “clearly and prominently 
disclosed mechanism” that consumers could use to prevent future 
data collection.315 
In the order, the FTC included a definition of “clearly and 
prominently.”316  It determined that “clear and prominent” disclosures 
are in a “type, size, and location sufficiently noticeable for an 
ordinary consumer to comprehend and read.”317  According to the 
FTC, the statements should also be in a print that “contrasts highly 
with the background on which they appear.”318  Additionally, the FTC 
stated that “in all instances,” required disclosures must be presented 
in an “understandable language and syntax,” not contradicted by any 
other statements.319  By requiring ScanScout to be direct about its 
targeted advertising practices, the FTC sought to prevent future 
privacy harms caused by covert collections of consumer data. 
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 310. See id. 
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3. Failure to Secure Personal Information 
A website’s failure to secure users’ personal data may be better 
characterized as a “broken promise” than as a failure to notify.320  
With regard to data security harms, the FTC does not focus on 
whether or not websites provided users with sufficient notice, but 
whether they breached their vows to keep user data secure.321  For 
example, the FTC complaint in In re Eli Lily & Co., is silent on the 
issue of notice.322  Instead, the FTC was concerned with how the 
pharmaceutical company, Eli Lily & Co. (“Eli Lily”), breached its 
promise to keep consumers’ personal information confidential,323 and 
the company’s failure to provide training, checks, and controls over 
consumers’ sensitive information.324 
Similarly, in United States v. ChoicePoint Inc., the FTC did not 
characterize ChoicePoint Inc.’s (“ChoicePoint”) failure to secure 
consumers’ personal data in terms of notice.325  ChoicePoint was a 
company that furnished personal data, like Social Security numbers, 
dates of birth, and credit card histories, to governments and 
businesses.326  In its complaint, the FTC found that ChoicePoint 
violated Section 5 because it failed to employ “reasonable and 
appropriate security measures” to protect consumers’ personal 
information.327  Though the FTC found that ChoicePoint violated 
Section 5, concerns for proper notice were not part of the FTC’s 
inquiry.328  Rather, the FTC’s concerns focused on ChoicePoint’s 
                                                                                                                                      
 320. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 643; Reidenberg et al., supra note 47, 
at 27 (“While the notice and choice framework may be effective to protect against 
privacy harms in some areas, the framework will inherently be unable to protect 
against some of the articulated harms. Breaches of commitments made in notices will 
violate the terms of user consent and create unauthorized disclosures, the inadequacy 
of data security cannot be cured by notice, and mismatches for data retention 
preclude the capability for notice to avoid the privacy harms.”). 
 321. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 47, at 28. 
 322. See generally Complaint, In re Eli Lily & Co., FTC File No. 012 3214,  No. C-
4047 (F.T.C. May 8, 2002). 
 323. Id. at 2.  Despite its promise, Eli Lily disclosed the email addresses of 669 of 
its customers after sending a mass email and leaving customers’ emails visible in the 
“to:” line of the message.  Id. 
 324. Id. at 3. 
 325. See generally Complaint, United States v. ChoicePoint Inc., FTC File No. 
0523069 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
 326. Id. at 3. 
 327. Id. at 9. 
 328. See id. 
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failures to sustain reasonable security measures, as well as the 
company’s breached privacy promises to consumers.329 
4. Unlawful Retention of Personal Information 
FTC enforcement actions also cover instances in which companies 
unnecessarily retain personal data.330  Still, the FTC does not address 
unlawful retention as a problem of insufficient notice, but as a 
security risk.331  For example, in its complaint against CardSystems 
Solutions, Inc. (“CardSystems”), the FTC held that CardSystems 
failed to reasonably secure personal information that was stored on 
its computer network.332  The FTC found that, in addition to failing to 
take reasonable measures to secure consumer data from hackers, 
CardSystems generated unnecessary risks by storing information for 
up to 30 days in an insecure state.333  Like other FTC complaints, the 
company’s retention practices were not challenged because 
consumers were not notified of how long their data was retained, 
rather, the retention practice was considered a Section 5 violation in 
that it caused the security and confidentiality of consumer data to be 
compromised.334 
D. Notice Problems in the Online World 
This Part examines various barriers to sufficient notice in the 
online space.  This Part also analyzes different obstacles that 
consumers encounter when they are confronted with websites’ 
privacy agreements, and how they prevent consumers from gaining 
awareness of websites’ data handling practices.  Specifically, this Part 
explores notice problems such as the high cost of reading privacy 
policies, the vague and misleading language that privacy polices 
                                                                                                                                      
 329. Id. at 9, 11; see also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 628; Reidenberg et 
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commonly use, and consumers’ general lack of awareness of how 
companies appropriate their personal data. 
1. The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies 
In the domains of arbitration provisions, FDA drug labeling and 
FTC enforcement actions, effective notice is critical to consumers’ 
informed consent and awareness of risk.  While settled principles of 
sufficient notice govern these areas of law, there is presently much 
discourse on how notice should be dispensed in the online world.335  
Under the notice and choice model, it is expected that online 
consumers self-manage their privacy by reading websites’ privacy 
policies, and, upon notice of these terms, choose whether or not to 
consent to them.336  However, some scholars contend that privacy 
policies fail to provide consumers with meaningful notice of websites’ 
data practices.337  Research shows that a majority of consumers fail to 
pay substantial attention to online notice statements.338  For example, 
in a study only 4.5% reported that they “always read” privacy policies 
and only 14.1% reported to “frequently” read them.339  Subjects of 
this study reported that privacy statements were too long and verbose 
to read.340 
                                                                                                                                      
 335. See e.g., Usable Privacy Project, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (2016), 
http://www.usableprivacy.org/ [https://perma.cc/63FM-LZUS] (exploring how natural 
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 336. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 
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 337. FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz has stated: “Initially, privacy policies seemed 
like a good idea. But in practice, they often leave a lot to be desired. In many cases, 
consumers don’t notice, read, or understand the privacy policies.”  Id. at 1884-85, 
(citing Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r Fed. Trade Comm’n, So Private, So Public: 
Individuals, the Internet & the Paradox of Behavioral Marketing, Remarks at the 
FTC Town Hall Meeting on Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, & 
Technology (Nov. 1, 2007)). 
 338. A 2002 study showed that only about .3% of Yahoo users read the websites 
privacy policy.  Even after Yahoo began to send users’ advertisements to their email 
accounts and mail, this figure rose to only 1%.  See id.  Another study reported that 
despite the fact that 63 out of 63 respondents reported to valuing privacy, only three 
reported to always reading online privacy.  See Gordon, supra note 14, at 13. 
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Don’t Read) Online Privacy Notices, 18 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 15, 20-21 
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 340. See Milne & Culnan, supra note 339, at 23 (finding one respondent of this 
study complained that “[p]rivacy notices are deliberately made too long and verbose. 
How about the ‘Privacy Notice for Dummies’ version?”).  Other research has shown 
that consumers generally face considerable difficulty when trying to decipher policy 
privacy terms.  See Aleecia M. McDonald, et al., A Comparative Study of Online 
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Consumers may refrain from reading privacy policies because they 
are too time-consuming and costly to read.341  Aleecia M. McDonald 
and Lorrie Faith Cranor investigated this proposition and studied the 
true costs of reading privacy policies.342  They calculated how much 
time and money the U.S. population would expend by reading every 
single privacy policy that it was exposed to over the course of a 
year.343  The study took into account variables like opportunity costs 
of reading privacy policies,344 the total amount of time it would take to 
read the privacy policies, and the financial value of that time.345  
McDonald and Cranor calculated that Americans, on average, visit 
1462 unique websites annually.346  The participants of their study 
spent a median of 23 to 24 minutes reading a typical 2500-word 
policy.347  McDonald and Cranor determined that if Americans were 
to read every single privacy policy in a year, it would take them 
approximately 201 hours and cost them about $3534 annually.348  They 
further calculated that if all Americans were to read privacy policies 
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 343. Id. at 548. 
 344. This included the loss of a potential financial gain when time is spent reading a 
privacy policy rather than an alternative, and potentially profitable, activity.  Id. at 
558-59. 
 345. Id. at 559-62. 
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 347. See McDonald & Cranor, supra note 342, at 552-53.  See also PROTECTING 
CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 70 (“A particularly strong illustration of 
where privacy notices have been ineffective is in the mobile context where, because 
of the small size of the device, a privacy notice can be spread out over 100 separate 
screens. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine consumers scrolling through each screen or 
making informed decisions based on the information contained in them.”). 
 348. McDonald & Cranor, supra note 342, at 562. 
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word for word, the value of time lost would total about $781 billion 
annually.349 
McDonald and Cranor concluded that typical consumers’ failure to 
read privacy policies may not evince a lack of concern for privacy.350  
Rather, the great expense of reading privacy policies may simply 
outweigh Internet users’ perceived costs of privacy harms.351  
McDonald and Cranor proposed that websites should reduce the cost 
of reading privacy policies.352  They concluded that decreasing the 
amount of time it takes to read a privacy policy, which could entail 
reducing the amount of text displayed, would enhance privacy 
policies’ practical benefits and utility to consumers.353 
2. Ambiguity and Consumer Misunderstanding 
a. Ambiguity of Privacy Policy Language  
Research suggests that privacy policies are verbose, legalistic, and 
generally hard to read,354 and that the language of privacy policies is 
ambiguous and misleading.355  Thus, even if readers were able to 
understand the complex language of a privacy policy, there may still 
be confusion over what the terms of the policy actually mean.356  A 
study by Professor Irene Pollach further demonstrates that the 
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language of privacy policies may create more confusion than clarity.357  
Pollach analyzed the rhetorical patterns of fifty different privacy 
policies, finding that common trends in vocabulary, syntax, and 
grammar created ambiguity and confusion.358  She determined that 
the choice of vocabulary in selected privacy policies “sugar-coat[ed]” 
companies’ data handling practices by de-emphasizing their 
invasiveness and framing the practices in a positive light.359 
Pollach also observed that privacy policies frequently denied that 
certain data practices were carried out.360  She found that negative 
statements such as “except as otherwise stated we do not . . . ” 
effectively gave companies “carte blanch . . . to engage in any practice 
not expressly ruled out.”361  Finally, Pollach observed that use of 
“modal” verbs and adverbs, such as “may,” “might,” and “perhaps” 
was a common trend among selected policies.362  For example, a 
model phrase might state “[f]rom time to time [we] may also provide 
names, addresses or email addresses to strategic partners who have 
information, products or services that may be of interest to you.”363  
She asserted that such modal language downplayed the frequency 
with which companies actually participated in data collection 
practices and allowed for open-ended interpretations of how 
companies appropriated consumer data.364  Pollach concluded that 
companies likely draft privacy policies more with the aim to avoid 
privacy litigation than to inform consumers of their data handling 
practices.365  She asserted that vague privacy policy language should 
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be clarified to minimize ambiguity and accurately convey companies’ 
true privacy terms.366 
b. Misunderstanding of Privacy Policy Text 
Other scholars’ research suggests that, due to the vagueness of 
privacy policy language, even legal experts may have difficulty 
understanding their terms.367  A study exploring privacy policy 
ambiguity surveyed three groups of participants: “Privacy Policy 
Experts,” which was composed of legal and public policy scholars; 
“Knowledgeable Users,” which consisted of law and computer science 
students; and “Crowd workers,” which were selected as a 
representative sample of the general population.368  All participants 
were required to read a privacy policy and then answer a question 
about a privacy practice (i.e., “Does the policy state that the website 
might collect contact information about its users?”).369  After selecting 
from the options “Yes,” “No,” “Unclear,” or “Not Applicable,” 
participants were asked to highlight the portion of policy text that 
supported their answer choice.370 
Basing their judgments on privacy policies alone, study participants 
frequently disagreed upon the nature of companies’ data-handling 
practices.371  This disagreement was even apparent among the Privacy 
Policy Experts group, which consisted of four of the study authors 
who were experienced law and public policy scholars.372  The study 
found that Privacy Policy Experts only reached a consensus on 
whether websites shared consumers’ financial information 62.5% of 
the time, and only reached a consensus on whether websites’ shared 
health information 50% of the time.373  Vague policy terminology like 
“personal information” invited too much room for interpretation and 
made it difficult for privacy experts to agree on the kind of 
                                                                                                                                      
 366. Pollach, supra note 13, at 107-08.  See also Reidenberg et al., supra note 47, at 
26. (“Vague notices do not provide users with meaningful information about 
practices to which they are asked to consent. Such vague and incomplete notices deny 
users the ability to control their personal information . . . . By contrast, notice that is 
complete, accurate, and specific regarding the terms that explain how, with whom, 
and for what purpose a user’s information will be shared enable effective consent 
from the user.”). 
 367. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 40. 
 368. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 53-54. 
 369. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 56-57. 
 370. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 57-59. 
 371. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 83. 
 372. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 54. 
 373. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 65. 
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information that websites collected.374  The study determined that 
privacy policies were often worded too ambiguously to convey 
effective notice, as privacy experts could not agree upon the accurate 
meaning of all of the privacy policy statements.375  Due to poor 
drafting and confusing language, even experienced privacy scholars 
could not produce a uniform, professional interpretation of the 
privacy policies’ terms.376 
Disagreement was even more pronounced between the 
Knowledgeable Users and crowd worker groups.  Knowledgeable 
User participants only agreed with each other 60% of the time when 
asked if a website’s privacy policy indicated collection of shared 
location information data.377  Similarly, crowd workers only agreed 
with each other 40% of the time when asked this same question.378  
The study concluded that overall lack of agreement among the three 
surveyed groups indicated that privacy policies lacked clarity and 
described data collection practices poorly.379  The study determined 
that websites must candidly “spell out” their privacy practices to 
improve consumers’ understandings of terms.380  It asserted that lack 
of agreement and difficulties in interpretation evinced that consumers 
were being misled by website privacy policies.381  The study contended 
that if privacy policies could not convey notice in a manner that a 
“reasonable person” could understand, then notice and choice failed 
as a framework.382 
c. False Assumptions and Lack of Awareness 
Research suggests that typical online consumers are unaware of the 
nature and scope of companies’ data collection practices.383  
                                                                                                                                      
 374. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 79. 
 375. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 79. 
 376. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 79. 
 377. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 65. 
 378. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 65. 
 379. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 83-85. 
 380. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 83-84 (“To have contextual integrity, 
the granular aspects of a data practice, not just whether a website collects, shares or 
deletes personal information in general, will need to be understandable to a user.  
Indeed, a policy statement acknowledging general data collection and/or sharing may 
do very little to inform readers about the practices relevant to the user.”). 
 381. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 83. 
 382. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 83. 
 383. See Joseph Turow et al., Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three 
Activities that Enable It, 21 (2009) (finding 54% of survey respondents wrongly 
stated that it was “True” that websites with privacy policies had to delete information 
like name and address upon their request); Solove, supra note 336, at 1886. 
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Consumers commonly harbor false assumptions about how websites 
collect their personal data.384  Scholars Solon Barocas and Helen 
Nissenbaum contend that there are some key data collection and 
sharing norms that are simply unapparent to online consumers.385  
They note that when consumers access a website, they may not be 
aware that contracting third party advertisers may be tracking their 
interactions with that site.386  Even if a website reveals how it collects 
consumer data through its privacy policy, this disclosure may still be 
incomplete because consumers are uninformed of how potential third 
party affiliates use their information.387  Privacy policies cannot 
describe the tracking and data handling practices of third party 
advertisers, as websites are practically limited to disclosures about 
their own privacy practices.388  Thus, the disclosures of privacy policies 
are inherently incomplete because policies fail to describe the full 
extent of what happens to consumer data.389  Unbeknownst to 
consumers, third party advertisers may use personal data in a manner 
that contravenes the privacy promises of the main website.390 
The “fickle” nature of privacy policies might also undermine 
consumers’ expectations of privacy.391  Many consumers may be 
unaware that the terms of privacy policies are often updated and 
changed.392  As a result, consumers do not possess one absolute set of 
privacy rights under any given privacy policy. Describing the 
“fickleness” of privacy policies, Solon and Nissenbaum reference the 
New York Times website, which at one point, reserved the right to 
change the terms of the privacy policy upon thirty days’ notice.393  As 
a result, consumers that wished to stay informed of any potential 
changes bore the onus of checking the website’s privacy statement 
every month.394  Solon and Nissenbaum concluded that the “short 
                                                                                                                                      
 384. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 11 at 78-80. 
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shelf-life” of online privacy policies undercut consumers’ abilities to 
form accurate expectations of websites’ privacy terms.395  When 
subjected to changing terms, consumers may find that their former 
privacy expectations are no longer valid.396 
III. ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE ONLINE NOTICE 
As explored in Part C, the current format and content of typical 
online privacy policies routinely fail to notify consumers of 
companies’ data collecting and sharing practices.  Privacy policies are 
poorly drafted with vague and misleading language. Beyond this, 
privacy policies are too costly to read, and companies can freely 
modify core privacy terms without affirmatively notifying consumers.  
The chronic ineffectiveness of online privacy policies is highly 
problematic, as sufficient notice is central to an individual’s ability to 
offer informed consent when sharing information online.  Examining 
elements of effective legal notice from different legal models is an 
important preliminary step in resolving pervasive notice problems 
online.  In the domain of arbitration clauses, for example, a showing 
of effective notice may evince individuals’ knowing and voluntary 
waiver of guaranteed legal rights.  In the context of FDA drug 
labeling rules, effective notice may ensure that consumers are 
properly apprised of warnings and directions for safe use.  Finally, 
effective notice is inherent to FTC enforcement actions against 
unauthorized disclosures and surreptitious data collection. 
 Part III extracts the most salient elements of effective online 
notice from the aforementioned legal models.  Using core common 
law principles of notice, and with reference to well-settled concepts of 
constructive notice and mutual assent, this Part evaluates the 
sufficiency of notice and “contract formation in cyberspace.”397  Part 
III also extracts principles from established legal paradigms to 
determine what constitutes effective online notice.  By borrowing 
standards from judicial and administrative law, this Part outlines the 
most crucial elements of effective online notice.  This Part also 
suggests how commercial websites can incorporate these elements 
into their regular data collection practices, which if implemented, may 
mitigate or prevent the notice problems discussed in Part C.  These 
elements are also summarized in tables, which are featured in the 
Appendix to this Note. 
                                                                                                                                      
 395. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 6. 
 396. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 5-6. 
 397. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’n Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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A. The Format of Effective Notice 
1. Readable Text 
Effective notice demands that the text of privacy policies be legible 
and relatively easy to comprehend.  Consumers commonly encounter 
difficulty with densely worded paragraphs of privacy policy text.398  
Though consumers tend to care about their online privacy, the 
majority of consumers do not read websites’ privacy policies, with 
some complaining that the language of privacy policies is too legalistic 
and verbose.399  The difficulty of reading privacy policies is thus a 
barrier to effective notice, as it discourages consumers from apprising 
themselves of privacy terms.400  To achieve effective notice, the format 
of privacy policies should enhance their eye appeal and legibility.  
Incorporating the FDA’s rule for “chunked” text may help to attain 
this goal.401 
On average, a privacy policy consists of 2500 words.402  As the FDA 
determined, dense paragraphs of fine print lack eye appeal and tend 
to overload consumers with information.403  The same issues likely 
pertain to privacy policies, which often explain terms in paragraph 
form or in the context of one long statement.  Chunking privacy 
policy information into lists would make privacy policies more usable 
for consumers.  Adopting this formatting style would reduce the 
“cognitive load” many consumers may experience when reading 
dense blocks of privacy policy text.404  Readers would not have to 
parse through an entire policy to find dispersed pieces of text that 
pertain to a specific data collection practice.  For example, listing all 
terms that describe data sharing under a centralized heading would 
enable consumers to easily locate information related to this topic.405  
To accelerate readers’ comprehension, companies could also organize 
core privacy terms under bullets,406 which would visually stand out on 
                                                                                                                                      
 398. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 70 (“[P]rivacy notices 
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a page and would naturally lead consumers’ eyes to listed 
statements.407  This formatting device may therefore be of particular 
use when alerting consumers to practices like sharing of financial 
data, which may expose consumers to special risks.  Dividing privacy 
policy statements into discrete segments and lists could also reduce 
the frequency of consumer reading errors.408 
If all privacy policies displayed key privacy terms in a standardized 
order, consumers could become familiar with this format and learn 
where to find specific terms in any privacy statement.409  FDA labeling 
practices suggest that standardizing the sequence of privacy policy 
statements could reduce consumer confusion over policy terms.410  
Information across different OTC drug labels is displayed under the 
same headings and in a uniform order, and labels are organized 
according to core drug facts such as directions, warnings, and 
ingredients.411  Similarly, a uniform privacy policy sequence could be 
organized with respect to key privacy terms.  Such key terms would 
reference data collection practices that present the greatest risk to 
consumers for privacy harms.  These terms would relate to practices 
such as data collection, sharing, and retention. 
Presenting privacy terms in a uniform order would also reduce the 
burden of reading privacy policies.412  This format would enable 
consumers to quickly identify a website’s key privacy conditions.413  
Standardization would have the additional benefit of enabling 
consumers to compare privacy terms across different privacy 
statements.414  If all privacy policies presented information in the same 
format and order, consumers could read two policies side by side and 
discern how data collection practices differ.  This ability to compare 
                                                                                                                                      
 407. See ScanScout Decision and Order, supra note 312, at 2. 
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different privacy policies would encourage consumers to actively 
manage their privacy.415 
Further, distilling paragraphs of privacy policy text into short and 
direct phrases could also enhance the effectiveness of privacy notices.  
As the FDA determined, statements that contain shorter sentences 
with simple terminology tend to reduce consumers’ cognitive 
processing demands.416  Reducing the text of privacy policies could 
free up consumers’ memory and enable them to understand policies 
at a faster rate.417 
Some privacy statements may be too detailed to reduce to shorter 
statements.  Therefore, it may be helpful to feature a full privacy 
policy on a website that is juxtaposed with a summarized privacy 
statements as a companion.  This would operate similarly to how 
OTC medications feature uniform product labels, but sometimes have 
package inserts that contain more extensive drug facts.418  Just as 
consumers read OTC drugs labels to learn of potential health risks 
prior to their purchase, online users could refer to shortened 
statements of core privacy terms, such as data collection, sharing, and 
retention, prior to interacting with a website or transmitting personal 
data.  Since consumers are not likely to read long privacy policies, a 
brief, summarized companion statement could, at the very least, offer 
a general landscape of a website’s terms. 
Symbolic representations of privacy warnings could also enhance 
the effectiveness of online notice.  As previously discussed, the FDA 
endorses the use of pictograms to depict proper product use and 
minimize safety risks for non-English speaking consumers of OTC 
drugs and other products.419  Websites could also graphically convey 
privacy warnings through visual illustrations.  For example, a symbol 
signifying the collection of location information may depict a globe or 
map and could offer consumers enhanced notice of this practice.  
Interpreting such a symbol would not require command of any 
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particular language, so consumers of all backgrounds could 
comprehend its message.420  The universal meaning of privacy symbols 
could provide consumers with identifiable warnings regardless of 
their primary language.  Furthermore, symbols would apprise 
consumers with more instantly recognizable warnings, as opposed to 
typical blocks of privacy policy text, which must be read and 
interpreted. 
2. Conspicuous Disclosures 
Online privacy statements should conspicuously stand out to 
consumers on a webpage.421  This visibility is necessary for consumers 
to notice and manifest consent to companies’ privacy terms.422  In the 
contract domain, constructive notice is premised on the idea that a 
party would have discovered a disputed provision had they been 
diligent.423  Yet even diligent readers of privacy policies might be 
unlikely to notice important terms, as disclosures of key data practices 
are often buried in text or articulated in ambiguous language.  
Presenting privacy terms in small print and dispersing them 
throughout dense paragraphs is akin to the contract notion of unfair 
surprise.424  Scattering critical disclosures throughout copious text 
effectively conceals these statements in plain sight. 
If online consumers cannot learn of a website’s privacy practices 
after reading its privacy statement, then they cannot be placed on 
constructive notice of a website’s data collection practices.425  Rather, 
it can only be said that online consumers have constructive notice of 
these practices if they would have had a fair opportunity to learn of 
                                                                                                                                      
 420. See id. 
 421. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’n Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002) 
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them after reading a website’s privacy statement.426  Applying this 
contract standard, privacy policies should, at the very least, put 
consumers on constructive notice of a website’s data practices.  In 
other words, privacy policies should be formatted so that “reasonably 
prudent” consumers will be capable of understanding their terms 
after reviewing them.427 
Critical privacy terms (like those pertaining to the collection or 
sharing of personally identifiable data) should be conspicuously 
pronounced in the body of policy text so that they are easily 
noticed.428  “User-friendly” formatting devices such as bold type, 
italics, capital letters, headings, and subheadings can also be used to 
highlight these terms and guide consumers’ eyes to important 
disclosures.429  These formatting devices may be implemented for 
visual contrast and to ensure that vital conditions are not buried in 
fine print. 
Consumers cannot learn of privacy policy terms that they 
physically cannot see.  Therefore, imposing minimum type size 
requirements, as the FDA implemented in its labeling rule, could also 
improve online notice.430  A mandatory baseline type size could 
ensure that statements are clearer to see and more easily stand out on 
a webpage.  Moreover, this minimum standard would ensure that a 
wider audience of consumers could read privacy policies, especially 
those with imperfect vision.431 
FTC privacy jurisprudence suggests how websites can enhance 
actual and constructive notice of the choice to opt-out of their data 
collection practices.  As the FTC demonstrated in ScanScout, 
effective notice requires websites to conspicuously disclose how 
consumers can opt-out of data collection practices.432  In ScanScout, 
the FTC described how opt-out mechanisms should be “clearly and 
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prominently” displayed to consumers.433  The FTC prescribed that the 
“type, size, and location” of this mechanism be “sufficiently 
noticeable” for consumers to read.434  The FTC also required that the 
disclosure statement contrast highly with a webpage’s background.435 
Visible opt-out mechanisms are also critical to consumers’ 
awareness and abstention from the clandestine tracking and 
collection practices of online advertisers.436  The majority of 
consumers are not aware that third party advertisers track their data 
to display ads and likely would not search for an opt-out mechanism 
on a website.  Thus, opt-out mechanisms should be visible enough to 
alert consumers of, and assist them in, revoking their participation in 
discreet marketing practices.437  Ideally, opt-out mechanisms should 
be prominently displayed on a webpage to ensure that when 
companies do share personal information for marketing purposes, 
consumers are offering informed consent. 
B. The Content of Effective Notice 
1. Accurate Disclosures 
As an initial matter, websites should accurately disclose how and 
when they collect sensitive, personally identifiable consumer data as 
well as the types of personally identifiable data that they collect.  
Consumers cannot offer informed consent to privacy terms if they do 
not know what practices they are assenting to, and sharing sensitive 
or personally identifiable data places consumers at a greater risk of 
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privacy harms.438  Without accurately describing the true nature and 
scope of their data collection practices, websites impose risks onto 
consumers, which they were never given a choice to assume. 
Furthermore, websites’ actual data collection practices of 
personally identifiable data should not contradict the disclosures of 
their privacy statements.  For example, in GeoCities, the FTC found 
that GeoCities breached its own privacy policy by collecting users’ 
names, birthdates, zip codes, and “optional” information, such as 
education level, income, and occupation.439  The Geocities privacy 
policy stated that it would “NEVER” share this data with anyone 
without user permission.440  In practice, however, Geocities rented 
and sold users’ personally identifiable information to third party 
advertisers without users’ informed consent.441 
Accurate disclosures in privacy policies are even more critical in 
instances where consumers do not expect to be subject to data 
collection or sharing.  Consumers often do not suspect that websites 
gather their personal data.442  Websites should thus present clear and 
specific disclosures that describe the actual mechanisms they employ 
if they collect or share consumer data.  In other words, if certain 
features of a website, like that of a downloadable toolbar, gather data 
in a manner that consumers would not ordinarily expect, that website 
should disclose this data collection practice so consumers do not 
develop erroneous assumptions about the purposes of those features.  
This would help ensure that companies’ commercial websites do not 
actively or inadvertently mislead consumers’ expectations of privacy. 
2. Precise Language 
Privacy policies should provide consumers with accurate and 
concrete descriptions of websites’ data collection practices.  Presently, 
many privacy statements are too ambiguous to provide consumers 
with clear impressions of websites’ data collection practices.443  For 
example, rather than stating that a website collects users “personal 
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information”—an indefinite term—a privacy statement should list the 
actual kinds of information that a website collects.  Additionally, 
articulating privacy policy statements in direct, action-oriented 
phrases could improve consumer notice.  Similar to how the FDA 
requires OTC drug labels to feature statements such as, “see your 
doctor if . . . ,” privacy statements could be formulated to give 
consumers clear ideas of what steps they should take to secure their 
data.444  For example, if a privacy policy states that a website uses 
cookies to collect user data, it could follow this disclosure with a 
directive phrase such as, “to change your privacy settings . . . ” to help 
consumers limit such collection.  These instructive statements would 
offer clarity as to what specific steps consumers could take to 
proactively manage their privacy. 
Changing the grammar and syntax of some online disclosure 
statements could also make notice more effective.  Permissive phrases 
such as “may collect,” “may share,” and “from time to time” 
contribute to consumer confusion.445  Instead, effective notice 
statements should be expressed in definite language to inform 
consumers if a website does indeed engage in a particular practice.  
Replacing terms like “may collect” or “from time to time” with “we 
will collect your data when . . . ,” and “we will share your data 
with . . . ” would clarify the nature and extent of websites’ actual data 
collection methods.  More so, articulating disclosures in 
straightforward terms would deter consumers from developing false 
expectations of websites’ privacy conditions.446  This is because 
conditional terminology can conjure doubt as to the extent of a 
website’s participation in data collection.447 
Finally, changing the structure of some privacy statements from the 
passive voice to the active voice could increase the clarity of privacy 
disclosures.448  Modifying vague, typical policy phrases such as, “your 
information may be shared” to “we share your information with X, Y, 
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found that the Toolbar transmitted the personally identifiable information that it 
gathered.  This information included credit card and financial account numbers and 
Social Security numbers entered into secure web pages. Upromise Complaint, supra 
note 10, at 3. 
 447. See Pollach, supra note 13, at 106-07. 
 448. See Pollach, supra note 13, at 106. 
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Z . . . ” would give consumers better insight into what actors are 
handling their data.449  Passive sentence structures enable websites to 
downplay their participation in data collection, and conceal what 
other parties may be involved in such practices.450  Adopting the 
active voice in disclosure statements would make which parties are 
accountable for data collection and sharing more apparent. 
3.  Affirmative Consent to Modified Material Terms 
Some courts have held that revised contracts merely have the status 
of a new offer, and are not binding on a party until its terms are 
accepted.451  A party must therefore be notified of new terms to 
manifest assent; “an offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless 
he knows of its existence.”452  Applying this contract principle to 
online privacy agreements, websites too should require consumers to 
affirmatively agree to privacy policy changes prior to appropriating 
consumer data in a materially different manner.453  At minimum, 
effective notice requires websites to apprise consumers of material 
changes to privacy policy terms and to obtain consumers’ consent. 
The contract principle of unconscionability may also be applicable 
in cases in which websites unilaterally change their terms without 
notice.  In Hooters v. Phillips, the Fourth Circuit refused to enforce 
an arbitration provision in an employee contract because the 
employer reserved the right to change arbitration terms at any point 
post-agreement.454  In this same way, privacy policies could be 
considered voidable if companies make material modifications 
without attaining consumer notice and consent.  Companies’ abilities 
to alter consumers’ privacy rights at will and without notice reflect a 
disparity in bargaining power between companies and consumers.  
This lack of mutuality has been held to be a defining characteristic of 
an unconscionable and voidable agreement.455 
                                                                                                                                      
 449. See Pollach, supra note 13, at 106. 
 450. See Pollach, supra note 13, at 106. 
 451. See Douglas v. U.S. District Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 495 F.3d 1062, 1066 
(N.D. Cal. 2007) 
 452. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4:16 ( 
Richard A. Lord, 4th ed. 1990). 
 453. See Douglas v. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 495 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 
2007) (“A revised contract is merely an offer and does not bind the parties until it is 
accepted.”) (citing Matanuska Valley Farmers Cooperating Ass’n v. Monaghan, 188 
F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1951)). 
 454. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 1173 F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 455. See id. at 936. 
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FTC jurisprudence also suggests that websites’ material 
modifications to privacy policies without consumers’ consent may 
qualify as an “unfair . . . practice.”456  In Facebook, for example, the 
FTC determined that Facebook committed a deceptive practice 
because it changed its privacy policy to increase the visibility of users’ 
accounts to third parties.457  As Facebook demonstrates, routine 
notice of material policy changes is critical in the context of social 
media websites, as these websites especially gather vast quantities of 
personally identifiable information.  Social media websites in 
particular should routinely request consumers’ express consent prior 
to executing changes that could alter the privacy of personal data; 
such websites should not commence new data collection or sharing 
practices prior to receiving this express consent.458 
On the whole, requiring routine agreement to policy changes could 
ultimately create more realistic expectations of online privacy.459  
Acquiring consumers’ express consent to modifications would endow 
them with a more meaningful say in how their data is appropriated.  
Finally, alerting consumers to material changes would relieve them of 
the onus of having to regularly check for modifications in privacy 
terms.  Consumers would be able to rely on the fact that the websites 
would apprise them of updates as soon as “fickle” privacy policies 
were modified.460 
4. “Knowing and Voluntary” Assent 
Some data collection practices prompt consumers to waive privacy 
rights that are protected by state and federal statutes.  For example, 
some websites have been known to collect personally identifiable 
health and financial data from consumers.461  These collection 
practices contravene the statutory purposes of HIPAA, which guards 
the privacy of medical records,462 and the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, 
                                                                                                                                      
 456. See Facebook, Complaint, supra note 288, at 9. 
 457. See id. 
 458. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 76-77. 
 459. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 76-77. 
 460. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 5-6. 
 461. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 63 (evaluating study participants’ 
awareness of companies collection practices of health and financial data.). 
 462. HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
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which prevents financial institutions from disclosing consumers’ 
financial data to third parties.463 
If institutions such as hospitals, insurance companies, and banks 
are forbidden from surreptitiously sharing personally identifiable 
data, then commercial websites too should be held to similar 
standards.  Though constructive notice may suffice in many contexts, 
when data collection practices implicate legally protected privacy 
rights, a more stringent notice standard is required.  The notice model 
in these contexts should be analogous to that of the “knowing and 
voluntary” standard in arbitration clause disputes. 
Though the knowing and voluntary standard of review is not the 
default means of evaluating arbitration contracts, it may be applied in 
special cases where arbitration agreements prompt signatories to 
forfeit guaranteed legal rights.  As the Ninth Circuit suggested in 
Nelson v. Bagdad Copper Corp., when websites collect data that is 
protected by state and federal statutes, higher standards of notice 
should be in place.464  Websites’ privacy terms should not contravene 
or undermine the purposes of established privacy laws.  Though 
websites need not mold their privacy practices according to the 
privacy laws of every state or nation, they should provide elevated 
notice when collecting particularly sensitive consumer information 
that is sometimes protected by statute.  Health and financial 
information, in particular, should require a more stringent standard of 
notice.  Not only is this data protected by both state and federal 
privacy laws, but it also tends to create greater risks of privacy harms 
when collected and shared.465 
                                                                                                                                      
 463. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801 et. seq. (2012).  
Additionally, data handling practices that covertly collect consumer data may 
undermine the intent of some state privacy laws.  California’s 
Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, for instance, prohibits 
companies from installing spyware on consumers’ computers for data collection 
purposes.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22947-22947.6 (West 2015). 
 464. See Nelson v. Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Any 
bargain to waive the right to a judicial forum for civil rights claims, including those 
covered by the [Americans with Disabilities Act] . . . must at least be express.”); 
Lindgren v. Pub. Storage, 290 F. App’x 971, 972 (holding that forms signed by a 
former employee did not effectuate knowing agreement to submit civil rights claims 
against a former employer to arbitration). 
 465. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 9, § 2480e(a)(2) (West) (“A person shall not 
obtain the credit report of a consumer unless the person has secured the consent of 
the consumer, and the report is used for the purpose consented to by the 
consumer.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-10-104 (“[A] financial institution may not 
disclose to any person, except to the customer or the customer’s agent, any financial 
records relating to that customer . . . ”). 
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To adapt the “knowing and voluntary” standard for the online 
world, companies could expressly notify consumers of their collection 
of health or financial data on their homepages.  Though websites are 
limited in that they cannot apprise consumers with personal warnings, 
they can put mechanisms in place to prevent consumer interaction 
with their content until a notice statement is acknowledged.  A 
conspicuous opt-out option would fortify the legal significance of 
consumers’ consent.  If consumers were actually given the choice to 
deny a website’s collection of their sensitive, personally identifiable 
data, then their decision to allow this collection to proceed would be 
more voluntary and meaningful. 
CONCLUSION 
Existing legal models can provide valuable insight into the 
elements of effective online notice.  FDA labeling rules demonstrate 
that changing the format of privacy policies could improve their 
readability and eye-appeal.  Shortening lengthy paragraphs and 
distilling long sentences into brief phrases could reduce consumers’ 
cognitive load and enhance their understanding of key terms.  FTC 
enforcement actions also provide insight into the essential content of 
online notice statements.  These actions show that websites should 
apprise consumers of material changes to privacy policies and give 
them the opportunity to expressly consent to those new terms.466  
Finally, jurisprudence of arbitration agreements reveals that there 
should be elevated standards of consent when privacy policies prompt 
consumers to waive protected legal rights.  The “knowing” agreement 
standard, as applied to the privacy space, demonstrates that sensitive 
health and financial data should not be any less protected online than 
it is under federal privacy laws.467 
Nevertheless, even if websites were to incorporate essential 
elements of effective notice into their privacy statements, notice 
problems would remain.  Improving notice would not address issues 
relating to companies’ unnecessary retention468 of and failure to 
secure469 personally identifiable data.  Additionally, companies may 
not always have notice or control of the data collection practices of 
                                                                                                                                      
 466. See, e.g., Facebook, Complaint, supra note 288, at 7-9. 
 467. See Lindgren v. Pub. Storage, 290 Fed. Appx. 971 (9th Cir. 2008); Morrison v. 
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 668 (2003); Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper 
Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1997); Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 
121 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 468. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 47, at 24. 
 469. See, e.g., Eli Lily Complaint, supra note 322, at 2. 
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third party advertisers that routinely access their websites.  Therefore, 
even if a company were to draft an ideal privacy policy that 
effectively conveyed notice, third party data collection practices could 
easily contravene the promises of that policy.470 
Despite these limitations, notice remains a vital tool for the 
prevention of privacy harms.  Companies should draft and format 
privacy policies to provide consumers with clear and accurate notice 
of websites’ actual data collection practices.  Improving the content 
and format of privacy policies to mirror legally accepted notice 
standards would enhance policies’ usability and eye-appeal to 
consumers.  Consumers would be more likely to read privacy policies 
and actively manage their privacy if they found policies readable and 
trustworthy.  At the very least, improved policies would supply 
constructive notice, and enable inquiring consumers to have a fair 
chance of learning about websites’ actual data collection practices. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 470. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 5; PROTECTING CONSUMER 
PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 76-77. 
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Table 1: Format of Effective Notice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TYPE OF 
NOTICE 
NOTICE MECHANISM  
Symbolic 
disclosures 
Symbols, pictograms, and bulleted statements to 
accelerate understanding of terms 
“Chunked” 
formatting 
Statements that are “chunked” into brief phrases 
as opposed to blocks of text; “chunked” 
disclosures organized into lists can serve as user-
friendly companions to longer privacy statements 
Standardized 
sequences of 
notice 
statements  
Standardizing the order in which data collection 
practices are disclosed (similar to how all drug 
labels disclose drug facts in the same sequence) to 
enable consumer comparisons of different privacy 
statements 
Conspicuous 
disclosures 
and 
warnings 
Manipulation of type size, capitalization and bold 
type to emphasize critical privacy terms, especially 
those relating to collection of personally 
identifiable data 
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Table 2: Content of Effective Notice 
Clear 
disclosures  
Short, action-oriented 
warning statements that 
direct consumer behavior; 
precise, definite language 
and use of the active voice 
FDA OTC drug labels, 
which clearly describe 
steps to take before 
consuming a drug (“i.e. 
see your doctor if . . . ” 
“keep out of reach 
from children”). See 21 
C.F.R. § 201.66 
(5)(ii)(x). 
Accurate 
disclosures  
Privacy policies that 
describe the actual nature 
and scope of privacy 
practices; privacy policies 
that do not make promises 
that contravene 
companies’ actual data 
collection practices 
See e.g., In re 
Upromise, Inc., 
Complaint, FTC File 
No. 102 3116 at 3 
(Finding that a 
company told users its 
toolbar collected 
browsing data to offer 
savings, but it actually 
collected personally 
identifiable data such 
as banking 
information).  
Notice 
statements 
that 
require 
express, 
“knowing 
and 
voluntary” 
consumer 
assent 
 
Privacy policies that 
require express and 
informed consumer 
consent prior to engaging 
in data practices that 
implicate legally protected 
privacy rights 
 
Elevated notice 
standards for the 
collection of financial 
information like bank 
and credit card 
numbers (otherwise 
protected by the 
Gramm–Leach–Bliley 
Act); elevated notice 
standards for the 
collection of health 
information such as 
medical history 
(HIPPA). 
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Regular 
notification 
of 
modified 
privacy 
policy 
terms 
 
Privacy statements that 
routinely update 
consumers of material 
changes and require 
express consent before 
such changes go into effect 
 
Requiring express 
notice and affirmative 
consent when making 
private consumer data 
public.  See, e.g. In re 
Facebook, Inc., 
Complaint, FTC File 
No. 092 3184. 
